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The Rhetorical Antecedents to Vietnam, 
1945–1965 
Gregory A. Olson, George N. Dionisopoulos, 
and Steven R. Goldzwig 
8 
I do not believe that any of the Presidents who have been involved with Viet-
nam, Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, or President Nixon, 
foresaw or desired that the United States would become involved in a large scale 
war in Asia. But the fact remains that a steady progression of small decisions 
and actions over a period of 20 years had forestalled a clear-cut decision by the 
President or by the President and Congress—decision as to whether the defense 
of South Vietnam and involvement in a great war were necessary to the security 
and best interest of the United States. 
—Senator John Sherman Cooper (R-KY), Congressional Record, 1970 
In his 1987 doctoral thesis, General David Petraeus wrote of Vietnam: “We donot take the time to understand the nature of the society in which we are f ght-ing, the government we are supporting, or the enemy we are f ghting.”1 After
World War II, when the United States chose Vietnam as an area for nation building
as part of its Cold War strategy, little was known about that exotic land. In 1941,
for example, the government fles on Southeast Asia contained one folder whose
entire contents consisted of four magazine articles. Representative Mike Mansf eld
(D-MT), who would himself become a Senate expert on the region, confessed in
1949, “Unfortunately, I do not know much about the Indochinese situation. I do
not think that anyone does.” Representative John F. Kennedy (D-MA) admitted in
1951, after a trip there, that he was “confused, as most of us are” about the problems
in that foreign place. In 1954, no American books had been written on Indochina
(the three French colonies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), only a handful of
Americans were fuent in the Vietnamese language, and historian William Conrad
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Gibbons estimated that fewer than fve American academics had expertise on that
region.2 
Historian George Donelson Moss argues that “gradually, by stages,” American 
presidents led the nation into war in Vietnam. Harry S. Truman chose to support the 
French in their effort to maintain Vietnam as their colony after World War II. Dwight 
D. Eisenhower decided to replace the French in South Vietnam and commit America 
to nation building behind Vietnamese anti-Communist/nationalist Ngo Dinh Diem. 
John F. Kennedy escalated American commitment to a “small scale” war and, when 
Diem failed to live up to US expectations, had Diem deposed. Lyndon B. Johnson 
made the ultimate commitment to wage a major war in Vietnam to maintain the 
anti-Communist state American presidents had created.3 
Touchstones in Rhetorical Scholarship 
US FOREIGN POLICY RHETORIC 
Philip Wander observed that the rhetoric of US foreign policy during the Cold War 
drew signifcant implications from familiar phrases like “‘defending the free World,’ 
‘protecting National Security,’ ‘weighing our national interest,’ [and] ‘countering the 
Communist Menace.’” Wander characterized the discourse shaping the “early stages 
of American involvement in Vietnam” as largely a formal appeal to “prophetic du-
alism”—defned as “divid[ing] the world into two camps. Between them there is 
confict. One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God’s 
will. The other acts in direct opposition.” With no middle ground to traverse, any 
compromise is viewed as “appeasement.” Attempts to remain neutral are a waste of 
time, and calls for negotiation are viewed as a form of “surrender.” “One advantage 
of prophetic dualism, for those in offce, is that it stifes debate,” and “because it 
posits a life-and-death struggle, it encourages a heightened dependence on the es-
tablished order.” But its Achilles’ heel is that it “leaves little room for adaptation or 
compromise.”4 This led to Cold War thinking, including the belief that Communism 
was monolithic and controlled by Moscow, the acceptance of the domino theory, 
and fear of “losing” another Asian country following the perceived loss of China. 
Congress acquiesced as the executive branch tiptoed toward a major land war in 
Asia, but the beginnings of congressional dissent started by 1953, and by the time 
LBJ committed American ground troops in summer 1965, that dissent had become a 
major impediment to LBJ and was picking up momentum with the public, particu-
larly on college campuses. 
CONFLICT AND IMAGE PRODUCTION 
The stakes involved in this discourse were made more real when they would trans-
mogrify from symbolic confrontations into tangible combat in which the United 
States would by both mission and design invade a nation to save it for democracy. 
Rhetorical scholars have examined how Cold War rhetoric could lead to action 
in a tense, unstable, and particularly polarized environment. While ongoing rhetori-
cal battle can rally a nation, it can also make it easier to go to war.5 These rhetorical 
contours shape and complicate the antecedent rhetoric associated with the origins of 
the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War. In the next section, we provide 
a rhetorical history that is intended to highlight the many small steps taken by mul-
tiple administrations that led America to war in Southeast Asia. 
WORLD WAR II AND 
THE COLD WAR 
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Ho Chi Minh 
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt strongly opposed allowing 
the French to return to their colony of Vietnam after the war. In a 1944 memo to 
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, FDR wrote that he had told the British ambassador to 
the United States that “Indo-China should not go back to France, but that it should 
be administered by an international trusteeship.” The president added: “France has 
milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to some-
thing better than that.”6 Roosevelt wanted a United Nations trusteeship, leading 
to eventual independence. At the  Tehran Conference in 1943, Roosevelt’s proposal 
had been supported by Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek, the leaders of the Soviet 
Union and China, but British prime minister Winston Churchill vehemently op-
posed it; the British had their own colonies to protect and were threatened by the 
idea of trusteeship. FDR resented France’s collaboration with the Japanese in Indo-
china during World War II. After France’s defeat by Germany, the pro-German Vichy 
French government cooperated with Japan; Japan recognized French sovereignty in 
Indochina, and the French allowed the Japanese military to occupy the colonies. By 
the time of Roosevelt’s death on April 12, 1945, the realities of the postwar world 
were becoming clear, and Roosevelt had become more ambivalent in his support for 
Vietnamese independence. Whatever hostility FDR felt toward France, the United 
States needed it as an ally in European reconstruction and against Soviet military 
expansion. Further, advocating trusteeship status for Indochina while denying that 
status for the Pacifc islands the United States had taken from Japan after World War 
II smacked of hypocrisy.7 
Less than fve months after Truman assumed the presidency, Ho Chi Minh 
declared independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. A nationalist and 
a Communist, Ho became the leader of both causes in Vietnam. Moss concludes: 
“Ho had a rare combination of talents: He was both a skilled organizer and a char-
ismatic fgure, a visionary who gave expression to the nationalistic aspirations of 
most Vietnamese.” The US Department of State was aware of Ho’s gifts, writing in a 
1948 policy statement “of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the 
strongest and perhaps the ablest fgure in Indochina,” admitting that for the French 
to try to exclude him from any settlement in Vietnam would be dubious at best. Even 
though one State Department member recalled that everyone he knew who had 
encountered Ho concluded he “was frst and foremost a Vietnamese nationalist,” the 
United States was never able to look at the French-Vietnamese struggle as a colonial 
one because to most Americans at the onset of the Cold War, Communism and 
nationalism were mutually exclusive and Communism was monolithic, controlled 
from Moscow. Journalist Robert Shaplen saw Ho’s independence early, writing in 
1949: “Ho is the ‘old revolutionary’ who could become south Asia’s Tito.” American 
ethnocentricity meant that Ho often did not receive a fair hearing in the United 
States; as one example, in 1948, Time magazine referred to him as a “tubercular 
agitator,” “goat-bearded,” a “Mongoloid Trotsky.”8 
Born Nguyen Sinh Cung in 1890, Ho’s history is diffcult to trace, partially
because he often used pseudonyms. Ho left Vietnam in 1911 or 1912 and lived in
exile for the next thirty years. He was a seaman for a while, visiting both the United
States and England. During World War I, Ho moved to Paris, coming under the
infuence of French socialists, becoming a leader among Vietnamese nationalists,
and a founding member of the French Communist Party. At the end of the war,
Ho presented the great powers meeting at Versailles with a proposed program for
political reform in Vietnam, but there is no record that it was received, much less
considered. Ho moved to Moscow in 1924 to study Communism; he spent most THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
of the next ffteen years in the Soviet Union and China, preparing himself to lead TO VIETNAM 
a revolution against France. After the Japanese invasion of Vietnam in 1940, Ho
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fnally returned to his homeland and prepared to fght both the Japanese and the
French. 
Germany had easily defeated the French in spring 1940 but only occupied the 
northern part of the country, leaving a collaborationist French government located 
in the city of Vichy in nominal control. In August 1940, Japanese troops invaded 
northern Vietnam from China, meeting little French resistance. By the end of 1941, 
Japan controlled all of Vietnam but left the French, reluctant allies under the Vichy 
regime, to continue its administration of Indochina.9 
Ho’s nationalist/Communist group, the Viet Minh, waged a guerrilla war against 
the Japanese in northern Vietnam with some success. By spring 1945, Ho’s forces 
received support from the Offce of Strategic Services (OSS), the predecessor of the 
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), then operating out of a base in China. The 
Viet Minh also worked with OSS operatives to rescue downed American airmen. On 
March 9, with their military situation deteriorating and sensing that their French al-
lies would turn on them, Japanese forces arrested most French soldiers and off cials, 
briefy ending France’s colonial rule. When Japan surrendered, ending World War 
II, Ho’s forces were in the strongest position among Vietnamese nationalist groups, 
although their position was more dominant in the northern part of the country. The 
Viet Minh demanded and received the abdication of Emperor Bao Dai, who had 
served both the French and the Japanese. 
On September 2, 1945, Ho declared Vietnamese independence. Using aerial 
photographs, the OSS estimated between fve hundred thousand and six hundred 
thousand Vietnamese gathered in Hanoi to listen to Ho’s outdoor address. Archi-
medes L. A. Patti, an American with the OSS in attendance that day, compared the 
arriving Vietnamese throngs to “bees swarming” in anticipation of a leader who 
was as unknown to the Vietnamese as he was to US leaders in Washington. As Ho 
was introduced as “liberator and savior of the nation,” party members strategically 
scattered throughout the crowd started to chant, “Doc-Lap” (independence). Patti 
described Ho’s delivery as “powerful” and “emotional.” Ho began his speech by 
citing both the US Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen; journalist Stanley Karnow claimed that Ho obtained 
his copy of the American document from one of the OSS offcers. The Vietnamese 
nationalist intoned: 
“All men are created equal. The Creator has given us certain inviolable Rights; 
the right to Life, the right to be Free, and the right to achieve Happiness.” 
These immortal words are taken from the Declaration of Independence of 
the United States of America in 1776. In a larger sense, this means that: All the 
people on earth are born equal; All the people have the right to live, to be happy, 
to be free. 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, made at the time of 
the French Revolution, in 1791, also states: “Men are born and must remain free 
and have equal rights. Those are undeniable truths.” 
Ho’s words were certainly an attempt to convince the United States to support 
Vietnamese emancipation and meant to curry favor with any French sympathetic to 
his cause. Some have viewed Ho’s introduction as a callous attempt to manipulate 
American and French opinion, although the OSS agents present that day felt Ho 
sincerely appreciated the ideals of both the American and French revolutions. 
The Vietnamese leader went on to argue that French treatment of his compatriots 
surely did not live up to the lofty goals stated in these documents. Ho maintained 
that the French had given up any right to control Vietnam, ending with an appeal to 
the world community: 
World War II and the Cold War : The Rhetoric of Hearts and Minds (RHUS Vol. 8), edited by Martin J. Medhurst, Michigan State University Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central, 
         http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/marquette/detail.action?docID=5477559.
Created from marquette on 2018-10-17 10:03:44.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 ©
 2
01
8.
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
S
ta
te
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 P
re
ss
. A
ll 
rig
ht
s 
re
se
rv
ed
.
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists invaded Indochina to es-
tablish new bases for their fght against the Allies, the French colonialists went 
down on bended knee and handed over our country to them. Hence from that 
moment on our people became the victims of the French and the Japanese. 
Their sufferings and miseries increased. From the end of 1944 to the start of this 
year, from Quang Tri to north Viet Nam, more than two million of our fellow 
countrymen died of starvation. On March 9th, the French troops were disarmed 
by the Japanese. The French colonialists either fed or surrendered, showing that 
not only were they incapable of protecting us but that, in the course of f ve years,
they twice sold our country to the Japanese. . . . 
For these reasons, we, members of the Provisional Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, solemnly declare to the world that Viet Nam 
has the right to be a free and independent country—and in fact it is so already. 
The entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their spiritual and 
material forces, to sacrifce their lives and property, in order to safeguard their 
right to liberty and independence.10 
Later that September 1945, Lieutenant Colonel A. Peter Dewey of the OSS be-
came the frst American to die at the hands of Communist forces in Vietnam. The 
Viet Minh who ambushed Dewey in Saigon likely took him for a member of the 
French military, and while Dewey’s name does not grace the Vietnam War Memorial, 
it probably should. Dewey’s fnal wire seems prescient, if not prophetic: “Cochin-
china (southern Vietnam) is burning. The French and British are fnished here, and 
we ought to clear out of Southeast Asia.”11 
During this period, Ho appealed to President Truman and Secretary of State 
James Byrnes through a series of letters asking for American support for indepen-
dence. The Truman administration ignored these letters, and Ho came to understand 
that the United States would not support Vietnamese independence over France’s co-
lonial claims. Indeed, no nation recognized the new Republic of Vietnam after Ho’s 
speech, not even the Soviet Union. The French Communist Party favored returning 
Vietnam to colonial status, and Stalin was more concerned with pleasing his French 
allies than Ho, who to the Soviets may have seemed a minor Communist leader who 
was more a nationalist than he was a Communist.12 
At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the victorious Allies had selected Chi-
ang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese military to disarm and accept the surrender of 
Japanese troops in northern Vietnam and the British to do the same in the south. The 
French simply ignored Ho’s Declaration of Independence and worked with the Brit-
ish and Nationalist Chinese military in Vietnam to reposition their forces to reclaim 
their colony.13 
The Cold War Leads Truman to a Deeper 
Vietnam Commitment 
President Truman lacked experience in foreign affairs when he inherited the complex-
ities associated with managing the post–World War II era. Indochina’s fate seemed a 
minor issue compared to other more pressing problems, and Truman did not share 
Roosevelt’s strong anticolonialist views. Truman needed French support at the San 
Francisco Conference to create the United Nations, and the French Communist Party 
was strong enough at the end of World War II to pose a legitimate threat of gaining 
power through elections; Americans feared that criticism of France’s role in Indo- THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
china might cost French support for American goals in Europe. The administration TO VIETNAM 
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had quickly dropped the demand for a trusteeship and accepted France’s reoccupa-
tion of the former colony. As a result, America’s opportunity to embrace Vietnamese 
nationalism was lost. American aid to the French in Vietnam was covert at f rst, but 
the Truman administration supported France in reclaiming its colony and began to 
fnance its war against the Viet Minh that would last for the next eight years.14 
The Cold War heated up in Europe after World War II with the Soviet Union 
consolidating Eastern Europe into a Soviet bloc. In June 1948, Cold War tensions 
increased with the Soviet blockade of West Berlin. Then, in September 1949, Presi-
dent Truman announced to the nation that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic 
bomb, ending the American monopoly on that weapon. As journalist Robert Mann 
observed, this was a “staggering” pronouncement that “changed the essence of the 
Cold War and reordered America’s worldview.” The Pentagon Papers reveal that the 
Truman administration was ready to militarily defend Indochina by this time, but 
that commitment was later tempered by the Korean confict, which started the fol-
lowing summer. 
The US public’s shock at losing the nuclear weapons monopoly would only 
increase several months later when Mao Zedong and his Communist forces pushed 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government off the mainland to the island of Formosa 
(Taiwan) and established the People’s Republic of China. Mann suggests that the loss 
of the Chinese mainland to Communism “raised the stakes in Vietnam,” and the 
focus of Congress and the public, which had been on China, shifted to the French 
colonies. U.S. News & World Report observed: “All of a sudden, Indo-China is out 
front in the power struggle between Russia on the one hand and the Western world 
on the other.”15 
Mao’s government immediately recognized Ho’s Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam (the Soviet Union followed suit) and extended military aid. The Viet Minh now 
had a powerful ally on their northern border, making resupply easier and weaken-
ing the military position of France. Reacting to the changed military situation there, 
the United States quickly recognized the Bao Dai regime, something it had been 
reluctant to do after the French brought the discredited emperor back to power. 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded that Soviet recognition “should remove 
any illusions as to the ‘nationalist’ nature of Ho Chi Minh’s aims, and reveals Ho 
in his true colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in Indochina.” The 
Truman administration began to see Vietnam as pivotal to the security of Southeast 
Asia; it increased military aid for the French effort in Vietnam and for the f rst time, 
made the aid overt.16 
As early as the 1946 election, Republicans had used the “soft on Communism” 
charge against Democrats. Richard M. Nixon won a California House seat that year 
by “red-baiting” Jerry Voorhis, his incumbent Democratic opponent (Nixon em-
ployed the same strategy in 1950 when he moved to the Senate, defeating another 
Democratic incumbent, Helen Gahagan Douglas). Republican presidential nominee 
Thomas E. Dewey was considered a shoo-in in 1948, when he lost to Truman after 
running a reasoned campaign. After the Communist victory in 1949, Republican 
kid-gloves came off, leading to what scholar Robert P. Newman calls a period of 
“scapegoating and witch-hunting.” The Republican theme quickly shifted from a 
general “soft on Communism” charge against Democrats to the specifc “loss of 
China” one.17 
William Conrad Gibbons argues that members of Congress, particularly Re-
publicans, were “troubled and perplexed” by the Communist victory in China. This 
led to the claim that the Truman administration had “lost” China, which became a 
dominant political issue in 1950, helping Republicans to make electoral inroads in 
that year and leading them to political victory in 1952. Senator Joseph McCarthy 
(R-WI) became infamous in these partisan attacks, once publicly referring to Demo-
crats as the “party of treason.” Senator Arthur V. Watkins (R-UT) later admitted that 
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McCarthy brought the country to “depths as dark and fetid as ever stirred on this 
continent.” Republicans weren’t alone, though; Representative John Kennedy said in 
1950: “What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our president frittered 
away,” ominously forecasting that the United States must be ready “to hold the line 
in the rest of Asia.”18 The loss-of-China charges contributed to a Democratic defeat in 
1952 and later acted as a constraint on the Vietnam policies of Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson—it was no longer politically palatable for any Democrat to lose any 
part of Asia to Communism. Newman concludes: 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were terrifed at the prospect of losing Vietnam 
to Communism and thus suffering the same disaster that befell Truman because 
of his “loss” of China. Neither expected to win in Vietnam; they were content 
with continuing stalemate, since this would at least partially immunize them 
from right wing charges of allowing the Communists to take over yet another 
Asian territory.19 
North Korea’s invasion of South Korea on June 27, 1950, caught the United 
States and most of the world by surprise; two days later, the Truman administration 
followed through on its plan to increase military assistance to France, including the 
establishment of American military missions in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The 
Truman Doctrine of 1947 pledged that the United States would defend “free peoples” 
everywhere, and the Marshall Plan, which followed one year later, provided massive 
funding for European reconstruction. Both were based on George Kennan’s concept 
of “containment” of the Soviet Union. The Doctrine was used for aid to Greece and 
Turkey after Britain pulled out of those countries, to keep them out of the Soviet 
camp. Kennan himself had never wanted the continent of Asia to be included in a 
containment policy, but it was soon applied there. Gibbons suggests that the Truman 
Doctrine led to a “philosophy of intervention” that made it easier for Truman to 
come to the aid of South Korea and, later, for the United States to intervene in South 
Vietnam. The belief in monolithic Communism meant that American leaders never 
questioned that the North Koreans and the Chinese were proxies for the Soviets 
and if the Chinese would send troops against Americans in Korea, there was little 
doubt that they could do the same against the French in Indochina.20 As Truman 
warned: “The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism 
has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will 
now use armed invasion and war.”21 
Conservative Republican attacks on Truman over the fall of China soon shifted 
to criticism of his handling of the Korean War. Truman was criticized for not includ-
ing Congress in the decision to go to war and for leading the North Koreans to 
believe that the United States would not react if that country attacked South Korea. 
The Chinese Communist victory over Nationalist China and its political impact on 
American domestic politics, followed by the Korean confict, increased American 
anti-Communism, contributing to the momentum for an increased US role in Viet-
nam. According to Mann, the vilifcation of Truman over his Korean War policies 
led Eisenhower to conclude that the American public was not prepared for another 
war in Asia, helping to moderate his policy in South Vietnam; Lyndon Johnson drew 
a different conclusion; that it would be a mistake to go to war in Vietnam without 
congressional authorization.22 
Senator Theodore Francis Green (D-RI) pointed out the American dilemma in 
a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting with Secretary of State Acheson in 
spring 1950: “Everywhere the masses in these countries . . . are rising, and they are 
conducting what will ultimately be—it is a question of time—successful revolutions, THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
but we are identifed to those masses as being the defenders of the status quo.” Many TO VIETNAM 
Americans understood this, but France wasn’t willing to free its colonies and was 
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able to exploit America’s desire to get the French to join the European Defense Com-
munity (EDC). In what Acheson later called “blackmail,” France extorted the US 
for more military aid in Indochina to free French resources to help provide for the 
collective defense of Europe. By the early 1950s, the United States was funding one-
half of France’s war effort. The danger for the Truman administration was that France 
would quit Vietnam and turn over the responsibility to the United States, which was 
already fghting a war in Korea. France ultimately rejected the EDC, partially over the 
issue of rearming West Germany. 
In late September and October 1950, General Vo Nguyen Giap, now the recipi-
ent of massive Chinese aid, including military trainers, led a Viet Minh offensive in 
northern Vietnam that drove the French out of most of the territory between Hanoi 
and the Chinese border; Joseph Buttinger called it the “greatest military defeat in 
France’s colonial history” to that point. For the frst time, the French military had 
lost a battle to colonial forces. While the Viet Minh victory was taking place, a joint 
memorandum from the Departments of State and Defense to the National Security 
Council did not recommend American intervention but said: “Firm non-Commu-
nist control of Indochina is of critical strategic importance to US national interests. 
The loss of Indochina to Communist forces would undoubtedly lead to the loss of 
Southeast Asia.”23 At a minimum, prevention of this presumed domino effect would 
now require increased military and economic aid, replete with additional technical 
assistance and capital investment.24 The Truman administration was inching toward 
a military commitment to Vietnam. 
Eisenhower and the Decision Not to Intervene 
at Dien Bien Phu 
Before his 1952 election, Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote in his diary about the need 
to support the French effort in Indochina, but expressed skepticism about the likeli-
hood of a military victory there.25 Like Roosevelt, President Eisenhower assumed 
offce with a strong aversion to colonialism, once recalling that in 1950 he “begged 
the French” to end colonialism in Indochina, to no avail. Further, Eisenhower had 
run for off ce on a peace platform and needed to quickly end the conf ict in Korea; 
that would have made it diffcult to send American forces to fght a different land 
war in Asia.26 
Eisenhower inherited the Truman administration policy of ever-increasing com-
mitment to the French effort to defeat Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh. When Presi-
dent-elect Eisenhower met with Truman and Acheson in late 1952, Truman stressed 
the need for continuity in foreign policy; Acheson emphasized the importance of 
keeping Indochina out of the Communist bloc, arguing: “This is an urgent matter 
upon which the new administration must be prepared to act.” Eisenhower was a 
staunch advocate of both the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine and soon made 
it clear not only that he was in agreement with Truman administration policy in 
Indochina, but that he was willing to increase that commitment. John Foster Dulles, 
Eisenhower’s new secretary of state and most infuential adviser on foreign policy, 
agreed with Eisenhower. In 1950, Dulles had admitted the diffculty of the problem 
in Indochina, and even though he opposed French colonialism, thought that the 
United States must support France, writing: “It seems that, as is often the case, it is 
necessary as a practical matter to choose the lesser of two evils.”27 
In 1953, President Eisenhower’s frst year in offce, he did not publicly talk 
about Indochina often. When he did, it was usually in the context of Korea. Tru-
man had a deal with the French not to have a separate peace agreement in Korea. 
Eisenhower broke that agreement;28 the Korean armistice was reached in July 1953, 
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and, as feared, this enabled China to increase its military support to the Viet Minh, 
further weakening France’s military position. French public opinion had soured on 
the war; once the fghting stopped in Korea, it became increasingly diffcult to accept 
the loss of French blood in Indochina. As a result of increased Chinese aid, Eisen-
hower was more receptive to French requests for increased support for its war effort. 
At a National Security Council meeting shortly after the Korean armistice, Dulles 
quoted Eisenhower as saying that a “solution of the Indochina problem was the f rst 
priority,” more important than Korea, as Indochina’s loss would “cost us the rest of 
Southeast Asia.”29 
From the beginning of the US involvement in Indochina during the Truman 
administration, Congress had rarely been consulted nor was there much congressio-
nal debate on the issue.30 That changed in the summer of 1953 when the legislative 
branch of government became deeply involved with the Eisenhower administra-
tion’s request for $400 million in additional aid for France. The views of many in 
Congress seem surprising when contrasted to their better-known positions in the 
1960s and 1970s. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) was elected to the Senate in 1952 on 
Eisenhower’s coattails. Senator Goldwater is remembered as a staunch hawk over 
American involvement in Vietnam based on his campaign for the presidency in 1964 
and his stance on the war after his presidential defeat, but like many in Congress 
in the early 1950s, he had a strong aversion to colonialism. Further, he opposed 
committing US ground forces overseas unless absolutely necessary. In his memoir, 
Goldwater makes no mention of his thinking about Indochina in this early period. 
But the opposition Goldwater expressed in his Senate speech of July 1, 1953, seems 
surprising in retrospect. The frst-term senator, no doubt coincidentally, began his 
speech by quoting the same passage of the American Declaration of Independence 
as Ho had quoted in his own Vietnamese Declaration eight years earlier: “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.” Goldwater applied that introduction to the French 
treatment of the Indochinese and indicted France for failure to grant independence 
to the three Associated States, that is, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The senator ap-
pears prescient with hindsight, especially his prediction that “as surely as day follows 
night, our boys will follow this $400 million.”31 
Gibbons writes that when this bill reached the Senate foor, “for the f rst time 
since the Indochina war began in 1945, a very frank and realistic debate about the 
situation, and about the dilemma facing the United States,” was held.32 Senator 
Goldwater wanted to amend the bill to make this aid contingent upon the French 
setting a specif c date to grant independence to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; this 
was the frst attempt to place conditions on aid to France for use in Indochina. Gold-
water received considerable support from his colleagues, especially among conser-
vative Republicans who were opposing a Republican president. But there also was 
support from liberal Democrats, John Kennedy, who had moved from the House 
to the Senate in 1953, favored Goldwater’s proposal and offered a friendly amend-
ment to soften the language in order to gain votes; Goldwater accepted Kennedy’s 
more moderate language. Later, an amendment was offered to cut $100 million from 
Eisenhower’s request. Dulles was concerned enough about the amendments to get 
Eisenhower to intervene personally with some members of Congress to vote against 
them. Goldwater’s amendment was defeated 64–17 and eventually, Eisenhower’s 
full $400 million request was allocated without France being required to set a date 
for independence. But Goldwater’s speech and the ensuing Senate debate show that 
opposition existed to America’s initial drift toward direct military involvement in 
Indochina.33 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
In a speech to the Governors’ Conference one month later, Eisenhower spoke TO VIETNAM 
on a myriad of issues, including his justifcation for spending the $400 million. 
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The argument he used involved what in hindsight seems an extreme version of the 
domino theory: 
Now, frst of all, the last great population remaining in Asia that has not become 
dominated by the Kremlin, of course, is the sub-continent of India, including 
the Pakistan government. Here are 350 million people, still free. Now let us 
assume that we lose Indochina. If Indochina goes, several things happen right 
away. The Malayan peninsula . . . would be scarcely defensible—and tin and 
tungsten that we so greatly value from that area would cease coming. But all 
India would be outfanked. Burma would certainly, in its weakened condition, 
be no defense. Now, India is surrounded on that side by the Communist empire. 
Iran on its left is in a weakened condition. . . . All of that weakening position 
around there is very ominous for the United States, because fnally if we lost all 
that, how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia? So you see, 
somewhere along the line, this must be blocked. It must be blocked now. That 
is what the French are doing. 
So, when the United States votes $400 million to help that war, we are not 
voting for a giveaway program. We are voting for the cheapest way that we can to 
prevent the occurrence of something that would be of the most terrible signif -
cance for the United States of America.34 
In 1953, during the height of McCarthyism and the Cold War, few in Congress 
or the nation would have differed with Eisenhower’s view expressed in this speech. 
As discussed earlier, the argument for a domino theory was f rst offcially offered dur-
ing the Truman administration, in 1950. Eisenhower himself had often articulated a 
belief in what came to be called the domino theory, beginning as early as 1942, and 
by 1953 virtually all government offcials shared his view.35 Many would continue to 
believe it well into the 1960s and beyond. 
After the successful Viet Minh offensive in the North during autumn 1950, the 
war went better for the French. General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny infused conf dence 
in the French forces, and Giap overreached. As the battle in the North for control of 
the Red River Delta continued, de Lattre’s forces were able to reverse most of Giap’s 
gains from 1950. J. Lawton Collins, the US Army chief of staff, toured Vietnam in late 
1951, prophetically predicting: “This is largely a General de Lattre show. If anything 
should happen to him, there could well be a collapse in Indochina.” De Lattre died 
of cancer in January 1952 and was replaced by Raoul Salan, who lacked the charisma 
or strategic brilliance of his predecessor. The Americans pressed France for Salan to 
be replaced. French public fatigue with what its critics called “the dirty war” had 
been growing for some time, and in May 1953, the French government decided to 
go in a different direction; military command for Indochina was given to Henri 
Navarre.36 
Navarre was not excited about his assignment, believing that the best the French 
could achieve was a military stalemate and predicting that in his new post “I’ve got 
99 chances out of 100 of losing whatever reputation I have.” Navarre’s plan was the 
strategy selected for a last-gasp French military effort in Vietnam and an attempt 
to appease the Americans, who were banking the French effort; the plan involved 
increasing forces and a major offensive in the Red River Delta, but it never came to 
fruition. General Giap had made several forays into Laos, and the French were seek-
ing a way to defend that colony. In late 1953, Navarre chose to put a large force in the 
valley of Dien Bien Phu in far northwest Vietnam near the Laotian border. The idea 
was that Dien Bien Phu would operate as both an offensive and defensive base, to 
block Giap’s forces from moving back to Laos. Giap accepted the challenge, moving 
his forces to surround the new French base. Navarre did not finch, choosing not to 
remove his military when that was still possible. Both sides knew that the Indochina 
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War was moving toward negotiation, and by the time the battle started, the great 
powers had decided, against American wishes, that the approaching Geneva Confer-
ence would consider Indochina as well as Korea. Both Ho and the French wanted a 
major military victory to tip the scales of the fnal bargain toward their side. 
The logistical problem for the French was that Dien Bien Phu could only be 
supplied from the air. French strategists were certain that the Viet Minh would not 
be able to move artillery into the hills surrounding the French base, but in one of the 
most stunning feats in military history, Giap used more than two hundred thousand 
workers on foot, sometimes using bicycles, to transport artillery, mortars, and all 
necessary supplies through jungle and over mountains to the remote valley. Soon 
ffty thousand Viet Minh forces surrounded a garrison of twelve thousand, including 
French off cers, Foreign Legionnaires (mostly German), and North African, African, 
and Vietnamese troops. Giap’s forces were able to dig in the artillery and camouf age 
it so effectively that French artillery and bombing were not able to destroy it.37 
President Eisenhower had entered 1954 still on the horns of a dilemma: he 
was reluctant to support French colonialism but also unwilling to cede Indochina 
to Communism. At a press conference early in the year, the president admitted that 
“strange and weird things” were happening there; the military crisis at Dien Bien 
Phu, “whose name,” Eisenhower conceded, he could “never pronounce,” was capti-
vating the attention of the world. At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting in 
early January when Dien Bien Phu became the dominant focus of concern, Ike said 
the United States “would not intervene, but we had better go to full mobilization” 
if France pulled out of Indochina. That position was tested as the situation at Dien 
Bien Phu worsened. While the president considered intervention, his instincts told 
him to stay out.38 
In July 1953, the United States had sent f fty-fve US Air Force technicians to 
train the French in the maintenance of the American airplanes provided to them. 
To ease the stress on the French to supply Dien Bien Phu, the administration agreed 
on January 29, 1954, to send two hundred more air force technicians to service the 
B-26 bombers that had been provided to aid the French effort, as well as civilian 
pilots hired by the CIA, but rejected sending military pilots. This decision was taken 
without congressional consultation, leading to an outcry. Senator John Stennis (D-
MS) declared: “First we send them planes, then we send them men. . . . We are going 
to war, inch by inch.” Richard Russell (D-GA), the senior Democrat on the Armed 
Services Committee, called it a “mistake” that would likely lead to US ground forces 
in Indochina. By now a senator, Mike Mansfeld (D-MT) complained, “Our advice is 
not asked; our consent not required.”39 
At sunset on March 13, 1954, the Viet Minh attack on Dien Bien Phu com-
menced. Within the frst two days, Giap’s artillery inficted enough damage to shut 
down the French airstrips, making it necessary for all supplies to be parachuted to 
the trapped French force. Eisenhower at least firted with the use of US naval or air 
power, but was skeptical of the advisability of using ground troops. On March 24, for 
example, he told Dulles that he would not “wholly exclude the possibility of a single 
[US air] strike, if it were almost certain this would produce decisive result.” Among 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) at a NSC meeting on April 1, only Admiral Arthur 
Radford, the chair of the JCS, favored an airstrike using disguised US planes with 
American pilots. But one day later, even Radford concluded that it would be too late 
for such a strike to change the outcome for the French. During the spring 1954 crisis, 
Radford and Vice President Richard Nixon were the major hawks in the adminis-
tration—Nixon responded to a hypothetical question on how the administration 
would react to a French loss by saying, “We must take the risk by putting our boys 
in,” which may have been an attempt to push Ike to intervene at Dien Bien Phu.40 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
Dulles and Radford met with congressional leaders on April 3 about a TO VIETNAM 
congressional resolution that would act as a “predated declaration of war” (as the 
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Gulf of Tonkin Resolution did for President Johnson in 1964). Such a resolution 
had been discussed during the Korean confict, but was never acted upon. It quickly 
became apparent that congressional opposition to such a resolution was strong. 
Dulles recorded: “The feeling was unanimous that ‘we want no more Koreas with 
the United States furnishing 90 percent of the manpower.’” It became clear that 
the Eisenhower administration needed Great Britain involved if it had any chance 
to win over Congress. Interestingly, then-Senate minority leader Lyndon Johnson 
(D-TX) was at the Dulles meeting, and when LBJ reported what had taken place 
to four senators not in attendance, he told them that he “pounded the President’s 
desk in the Oval Offce to emphasize his opposition” to such a resolution. By 1964, 
with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution under consideration, President Johnson would 
change his mind about such resolutions. But the congressional opposition in 1954 
constrained Eisenhower when the French solicited a US airstrike in support of Dien 
Bien Phu on April 5; Congress provided the excuse for Ike to decline the request.41 
Nixon recorded in his diary that, after an April 6 meeting, “it was quite apparent 
that the President had backed down considerably from the strong position he had 
taken on Indochina the latter part of the previous week. He seemed resigned to 
doing nothing at all unless we could get the allies and the country to go along with 
whatever was suggested.”42 
On April 6, Senator Kennedy delivered a Senate speech, followed by a long 
colloquy in which many of his colleagues expressed agreement with him. Histo-
rian George C. Herring concludes that Kennedy “won praise from both sides of the 
aisle.” JFK began by stating, “The time has come for the American people to be told 
the blunt truth about Indochina.” That blunt truth, as Kennedy saw it, was “that 
no amount of American military assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy 
which is everywhere and at the same time nowhere, ‘an enemy of the people’ which 
has the sympathy and covert support of the people.” Ho and the Viet Minh were 
Communists masquerading as nationalists, but without political independence, the 
population would choose what Ho offered. While France had assured the United 
States that it would grant Indochinese independence, those promises had proven 
hollow: “Without the wholehearted support of the peoples of the Associated States, 
without a reliable and crusading native army with a dependable offcer corps, a 
military victory, even with American support, in that area is diffcult if not impos-
sible, of achievement”—those conditions could not be obtained, Kennedy argued, 
“without a change in the contractual relationships which presently exist between the 
Associated States and the French Union.” Reacting to congressional sensitivity to the 
administration’s lack of consultation, Kennedy admitted that the proper committees 
in Congress had been “briefed—if not consulted by the administration.”43 
Kennedy assailed the Korean analogy espoused by the administration and many 
in Congress that suggested the situation in Vietnam mirrored the one the United 
States had faced in Korea. The junior senator from Massachusetts argued: 
The situation might be compared to what the situation would have been in 
Korea, if the Japanese had maintained possession of Korea, if a Communist 
group of Koreans were carrying on a war there with Japan—which had domi-
nated that area for more than a century—and if we then went to the assistance 
of the Japanese, and put down the revolution of the native Koreans, even though 
they were Communists, and even though in taking that action we could not have 
the support of the non-Communist elements of the country. 
Historian George McT. Kahin concludes that even though the Korean analogy was 
fawed and Kennedy exposed its “speciousness” in this speech, the analogy contin-
ued to be used to justify US “intervention in Vietnam.”44 
Near the end of his speech, Kennedy pleaded: 
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if the French persist in their refusal to grant the legitimate independence and 
freedom desired by the peoples of the Associated States; and if those peoples 
and the other peoples of Asia remain aloof from the confict as they have in the 
past, then it is my hope that Secretary Dulles, before pledging our assistance at 
Geneva, will recognize the futility of channeling American men and machines 
into that hopeless internecine struggle.45 
Kennedy advocated for “united action” early in this speech, an administration 
effort to build a defensive alliance for Southeast Asia that Eisenhower had Dulles an-
nounce in a speech a week earlier. Dulles’s speech had been intentionally vague and 
led to concern by many that the administration planned to intervene in the French 
war in Vietnam. JFK was among the worried, fearing that united action “is likely 
to end up as unilateral action by our own country,” and while the commitment of 
many nations would be desirable, Kennedy cautioned, “To pour money, materiel, 
and men into the jungles of Indochina without at least a remote prospect of victory 
would be dangerously futile and self-destructive.” During the colloquy, Mansf eld 
asked Kennedy a “prearranged question” about united action: 
MANSFIELD: “I wonder if the Senator can tell the Senate what he thinks Secretary 
Dulles had in mind when he was making his speech before the Overseas 
Press Club in New York recently.” 
KENNEDY: “There is every indication that what he meant was that the United 
States will take the ultimate step.” 
MANSFIELD: “And what is that?” 
KENNEDY: “It is war.”46 
At his news conference the following day, President Eisenhower displayed signs 
that he was fully aware of Kennedy’s speech and the support it received from his 
Senate colleagues. The president referenced the domino theory in response to a ques-
tion about the “importance of Indochina to the free world.” Eisenhower asked his 
audience to consider “the ‘falling domino’ principle. You have a row of dominoes set 
up, you knock over the frst one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty 
that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration 
that would have the most profound infuences.” He warned of a “possible sequence 
of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and In-
donesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the 
disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, 
but now you are talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.” 
Ike concluded: “So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to 
the free world.”47 Later in that same news conference, echoing the concern raised in 
Kennedy’s speech, Eisenhower was asked directly if “as the last resort in Indochina” 
the United States was “prepared to go it alone.” The president responded rather 
peevishly: 
You are bringing up questions that I have explained in a very def nite sense sev-
eral times this morning. I am not saying what we are prepared to do because 
there is a Congress, and there are a number of our friends all over the world that 
are vitally engaged. I know what my own convictions on this matter are; but 
until the thing has been settled and properly worked out with the people who 
also bear responsibilities, I cannot afford to be airing them everywhere, because 
it sort of stultifes negotiation which is often necessary.48 
THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
On April 23, in an address at Transylvania College, Eisenhower made specif c TO VIETNAM 
reference to the critical importance of Dien Bien Phu: 
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The words “Dien Bien Phu” are no longer just a funny-sounding name, to be 
dismissed from the breakfast conversation because we don’t know where it is, 
or what it means. We begin to understand that in a far-off corner of the globe is 
an agony of confict, where no matter how it started, has become again a testing 
ground between dictatorship and freedom, a desire on the one side to give a 
people the right to live as they shall choose, and on the other side to dominate 
them and make them mere additional pawns in the machinations of a power-
hungry group in the Kremlin and in China.49 
This argument was repeated and reinforced on April 26 when Eisenhower, in re-
marks made before the US Chamber of Commerce, contended that it was “no longer 
necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition” regarding intervention in 
the region. The president averred, “No matter how the struggle may have started, it 
has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government 
and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest signifcance for us, and 
possibly for a long time into the future.”50 
On May 6, American pilots fying for the CIA who had volunteered for daytime 
parachute drops attempted to resupply the beleaguered French, but none of the ma-
terial was recovered in the shrinking perimeter controlled by Navarre’s forces. James 
McGovern, on his forty-ffth mission over Dien Bien Phu, and his copilot, Wally 
Buford, were killed when their plane was shot down, becoming the second and third 
Americans to die from hostile action in Vietnam. Neither man’s name is inscribed on 
the Vietnam War Memorial. Dien Bien Phu fell the next day, May 7, 1954. One day 
later, the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began.51 
The United States attended the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference only 
because France insisted on its presence. Dulles left after the Korean phase of the con-
ference, where he refused to shake hands with Chinese foreign minister Zhou En-lai. 
That left Under Secretary of State W. Bedell Smith in charge, but he later returned to 
the United States, putting the US delegation behind the third in command, U. Alexis 
Johnson. Johnson wrote in his memoir that he was surprised to be selected as he 
was not an expert on Indochina, but “I discovered when I returned to Washington 
that this did not automatically disqualify me, since none of my State Department 
colleagues seemed to have any clear notion of what we could hope to get out of the 
conference.” Smith returned for the conclusion of the conference, where Eisenhower 
issued an ambiguous statement, saying that the United States “has not itself been 
party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference” but that “the United 
States will not use force to disturb the settlement.” The administration knew that 
the West got a good deal in Geneva. Ho had negotiated for the thirteenth parallel as 
the temporary dividing line between North and South, but the temporary boundary 
was placed at the seventeenth, causing the Viet Minh to cede about one-quarter of 
the land they controlled. The Soviets and Chinese pressured Ho to settle, partially 
to keep the United States out of Indochina, and Ho reluctantly did so because of 
the promised 1956 unifcation elections. Bedell Smith predicted Ho would win 80 
percent of that vote; Volney Hurd of the Christian Science Monitor predicted 90 per-
cent. Because of Ho’s popularity, the Americans had no intention of allowing the 
Geneva-promised referendum to take place.52 
An American-led defensive alliance in Asia had been discussed since the late 
1940s. As the chances for saving the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu waned, the 
Eisenhower administration began to work in earnest on the concept, naming it 
“United Action.” Eisenhower had Dulles propose such an alliance for Southeast Asia 
on March 29, 1954, before the Overseas Press Club. Ike was forced to delay the 
creation of the alliance as the British were unwilling to begin discussions until after 
a settlement for Indochina had been decided upon at the Geneva Conference. Ike’s 
initiative eventually led to the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
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(SEATO). Dulles spent much of April visiting with American allies pushing for the 
concept. The Manila Pact, creating SEATO, was signed in September 1954 and in-
cluded the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Pakistan. Dulles tried to include Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, 
but that would have violated the Geneva agreements, which preceded the Manila 
Pact. Senator Mike Mansfeld was with the Manila delegation and signed the pact, 
rare for a member of Congress; Wayne Morse (Ind.-OR)53 strongly favored the pact; 
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he asked for the “pleasure” of mov-
ing that they ratify it and send it to the full Senate, where it passed 82–1. Morse 
and Mansfeld came to regret their support for SEATO. Historian David L. Anderson 
argues that with SEATO, Eisenhower “created the legal rationale for America’s next 
war.” George Donelson Moss considers SEATO the frst prong of US strategy devel-
oped in the summer of 1954; the second prong was to back Ngo Dinh Diem to head 
a permanent anti-Communist government in the Geneva-created zone south of the 
seventeenth parallel.54 
Eisenhower and the Decision to Support Ngo Dinh Diem 
Ngo Dinh Diem was a Vietnamese nationalist and also a Catholic, a minority in 
South Vietnam, where Catholics never exceeded 10 percent of the population; more 
than 80 percent were Buddhist. Diem had served the French and Bao Dai in several 
administrative posts in the 1920s and 1930s. His strongest nationalist credential was 
that he never collaborated with the French; that credential was weakened somewhat 
by his willingness to work with Japanese occupation forces during World War II. Bao 
Dai asked Diem to serve as prime minister in 1949, but Diem refused because the 
position lacked power under French rule. Instead, Diem went into exile. That exile 
aided Diem because nationalists who stayed and refused to join Ho’s Viet Minh were 
forced to work with the French. Diem was not tainted by that colonial connection. 
Diem’s exile was a hindrance when competing with Ho and the Viet Minh, who had 
fought both the French and the Japanese; Diem had not. 
Diem met Wesley Fishel in Japan in 1950. Fishel, a political scientist who later 
taught at Michigan State University, encouraged Diem to come to the United States, 
where he introduced him to Francis Cardinal Spellman. Spellman introduced Diem 
to other important American fgures, including Supreme Court justice William O. 
Douglas, although Douglas may have met Diem on a previous visit to Asia. In 1953, 
Justice Douglas introduced Senators Kennedy and Mansfeld to Diem. Diem became 
the best-known Vietnamese nationalist in this country, with many inf uential sup-
porters in what was called the Vietnam lobby. He spent several years at Maryknoll 
seminaries in New Jersey and New York while lobbying on the need for an indepen-
dent Vietnam; Robert Scheer believed that this period as a lobbyist “was perhaps the 
most successful role in his political life.” Fishel then hired Diem at Michigan State 
in 1953 as a Southeast Asian consultant.55 Ellen Hammer wrote: “Diem’s fervent 
Catholicism opened many doors”; Thomas Boettcher claimed, “Diem’s Catholic 
faith was his most positive political attribute in this country, for it was the only thing 
about him that did not seem irredeemably foreign to America’s parochial leaders.”56 
Senator Wayne Morse harshly interpreted the beginnings of US involvement with 
Diem’s American exile: 
He sat out the war in Washington, D.C., and in New York City. We made him 
our boy and took him back to Saigon, set him up in government, f nanced him THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
and militarized him, and then committed ourselves to him. That is where the TO VIETNAM 
commitment came from, from our own diplomatic illegitimate offspring.57 
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In late June 1954, Diem arrived in Vietnam as prime minister under Emperor 
Bao Dai. The likely scenario, suggested by Dulles and others, is that the French 
selected Diem because he was the most likely candidate to attract Vietnamese na-
tionalists and receive US support. Diem’s hatred for the French made them come 
to regret their decision. Diem’s earlier lobbying paid dividends, as the Eisenhower 
administration had been checking him out before the French pulled the trigger on 
his appointment. At a February 16, 1954, executive session of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee with Under Secretary of State Bedell Smith, Senator J. William 
Fulbright (D-AR) talked of the need for a strong leader, saying, “If [Bao Dai] is not 
any good, we ought to get another one.” Smith answered that a change in leadership 
was under consideration, referring to “providing certain religious leadership,” which 
was likely code for Diem. After a May meeting with Diem, C. Douglas Dillon, the US 
ambassador to France, cabled Dulles a mixed message: 
He impresses one as a mystic who has just emerged from a religious retreat into 
the cold world which is, in fact, almost what he has done. He appears too un-
worldly and unsophisticated to be able to cope with the grave problems and 
unscrupulous people he will fnd in Saigon. Yet his apparent sincerity, patriotic 
fervor and honesty are refreshing by comparison and we are led to think that 
these qualities may outweigh his other def ciencies. 
On balance we were favorably impressed but only in the realization that we 
are prepared to accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this Yogi-like mys-
tic could assume the charge he is apparently about to undertake only because 
the standard set by his predecessors is so low.58 
Senator Mansfeld’s top aide claimed that Diem was “a name [Mansf eld] car-
ried” after Justice Douglas introduced them in 1953. At the same time Dillon was 
writing to Dulles, Mansfeld received a letter from William vanden Heuvel, who 
worked at the US Embassy in Thailand, with a view similar to Dillon’s and one 
that showed how desperate the US government was to preserve a non-Communist 
southern state in Vietnam: 
Now that we have a Vietnamese leader without taint, I should hope that our 
Government will lend every means to build him into the strong f gure he must 
become. I have heard criticisms of Diem which describe him as “too religious” 
and “too much the fanatic.” My reply is that at this late hour perhaps only a 
fanatic zeal can galvanize the forces necessary for victory.59 
While most Vietnamese Catholics lived in the North, Diem was attractive to the 
well-educated and politically motivated Catholic minority in the South. Under the 
terms of the Geneva agreements, and with the help of a CIA propaganda program, 
more than one-half of the northern Catholics soon migrated south, broadening 
Diem’s appeal. But this Catholic migration also caused tension with non-Catholic 
southerners. After appointing Diem prime minister, Bao Dai remained in France, 
where he always felt more comfortable; he never returned to Vietnam. 
The Eisenhower administration still had doubts about Diem’s abilities. In Au-
gust, Ike planned a letter of support to Diem; it was drafted in September, but was 
not sent until late October. It was released after a well-publicized Senate report based 
on a Mansfeld visit to Vietnam that claimed no “promising” alternatives to Diem 
and concluded: “In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, I believe that 
the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam 
and the French Union forces there, except that of a humanitarian nature.” Chester 
Cooper described the link between Mansfeld’s report and the release of Eisenhower’s 
letter to Diem: 
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Mansfeld’s report had an important infuence on the Administration’s decision 
to move forward with an aid program for the struggling Saigon Government. 
. . . President Eisenhower sent a letter to Premier Diem, and it was that letter 
that was cited by the members of the Kennedy Administration and even more 
often by offcials in the Johnson Administration to relate the origin and conti-
nuity of U.S. policy in support of Diem to the earliest years of the Eisenhower 
Administration.60 
Perhaps as a response to Mansfeld’s criticism of US aid, Ike’s letter to Diem offering 
assistance did have some general performance criteria; the president did not issue a 
carte blanche: 
The purpose of this offer is to assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing 
and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subver-
sion or aggression through military means. The Government of the United States 
expects that this aid will be met by performance on the part of the Government 
of Viet-Nam in undertaking needed reforms. It hopes that such aid, combined 
with your own continuing efforts, will contribute effectively toward an indepen-
dent Viet-Nam endowed with a strong government. Such a government would, I 
hope, be so responsive to the nationalist aspirations of its people, so enlightened 
in purpose and effective in performance, that it will be respected both at home 
and abroad and discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology 
on your free people.61 
By spring 1955, General J. Lawton Collins, President Eisenhower’s temporary 
ambassador to South Vietnam, had lost confdence in Diem, and the so-called Viet-
namese sects joined in open rebellion against his government. With the help of 
his American supporters, particularly Colonel Edward Lansdale of the CIA, Diem 
dealt effectively with this challenge and regained the support of the Eisenhower 
administration. 
The administration wanted to avoid the reunifcation elections promised at the 
Geneva Conference, but did not openly say so, fearful of forcing the North to resume 
the war. Instead, they recommended conditions for a plebiscite that Communists 
had already rejected in Germany and Korea. That summer, Diem rejected America’s 
cautious approach, repudiated the Geneva-promised elections, and instead sched-
uled an October plebiscite between himself and Bao Dai. In a fraud-f lled election, 
Diem claimed 98.2 percent of the vote.62 
Diem’s success in the f rst half of 1955 was aided by Joseph Kennedy, the sena-
tor’s father, and Francis Cardinal Spellman, both of whom became leaders in the 
Vietnam lobby. Later in that year, that group created American Friends of Vietnam 
(AFV), a formal lobbying organization for Diem and South Vietnam. By 1956, the 
AFV counted thirty-two members from the House and fve senators in the organiza-
tion, including Kennedy. Among other infuential Americans belonging to the AFV 
were Justice Douglas and Henry Luce, publisher of Time and Life. The group lost 
infuence by the early 1960s as many members left due to disenchantment with 
Diem. After Diem was deposed, it reemerged as a proponent of American escalation 
in Vietnam.63 
The AFV’s initial goal was to persuade the American public and the Eisenhower
administration to thwart the unifcation elections promised at the Geneva Confer-
ence. John Kennedy delivered a speech to the AFV on June 1, 1956, and in his
address, he made the expected argument against holding elections, but the admin-
istration didn’t need persuading; it was already in agreement with the AFV on the THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
issue. President Eisenhower himself sent his “warm greetings” to the conference TO VIETNAM 
participants.64 
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Like most Americans at the time, Kennedy fagrantly exaggerated Diem’s suc-
cesses in this speech. The senator’s rhetoric would have made it diffcult for him to 
disengage from Vietnam after he was elevated to the presidency. Kennedy argued 
that “Vietnam represents the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the 
keystone to the arch, the fnger in the dike,” followed by a stark interpretation of 
the domino theory and the paternalistic line: “If we are not the parents of little 
Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents.” The senator must have later realized his 
hyperbole, as he left all of these things out of a summary of this speech published in 
a book on his foreign policy positions timed for his run for the presidency. Kennedy 
continued in his Washington speech to the AFV: 
Informational and propaganda activities, warning of the evils of Communism 
and the blessings of the American way of life, are not enough in a country where 
concepts of free enterprise and capitalism are meaningless, where poverty and 
hunger are not enemies across the 17th parallel but enemies within their midst. 
As Ambassador Chüöng65 has recently said: “People cannot be expected to 
fght for the Free World unless they have their own freedom to defend, their 
freedom from foreign domination as well as freedom from misery, oppression, 
corruption.”66 
North Vietnam actively attempted to consult with Diem’s government to prepare 
for reunifcation elections, but these efforts were ignored by the South and received 
little support from the Geneva signatories, including China and the Soviet Union. 
Kahin maintained that some US offcials viewed the elections called for in the Ge-
neva agreements as a “binding commitment”; there were Americans who agreed with 
France and Britain that the war would immediately resume if the elections were not 
held. That did not happen, but failure to hold elections made a second Indochina war 
inevitable. After defeating the French, Ho’s government was not willing to settle for 
less than half of Vietnam. America had fashioned an inconsistent position of support-
ing reunifcation elections in Germany and Korea, where the United States expected 
to win, but not in Vietnam, where it was sure to lose. The United States “contradicted” 
its pledge at Geneva: “In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall 
continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Na-
tions to insure that they are conducted fairly.” When the elections were not held and 
there was no immediate and dramatic response from Hanoi, a certain complacency 
set in with the belief that nation building in South Vietnam would be successful.67 
American Friends of Vietnam also worked for several years to bring Diem back 
to the United States for a triumphant return, and that visit occurred in May 1957. 
Eisenhower personally greeted Diem at the airport and called him the “miracle man” 
of Asia, even loaning Diem his personal airplane for his stay. Diem spoke to the Na-
tional Press Club, was honored by the AFV, received an honorary degree from Michi-
gan State University, had a reception with the Council on Foreign Relations, had 
breakfast and a private mass with Cardinal Spellman, had a private luncheon with 
John D. Rockefeller, attended a banquet in his honor hosted by Time-Life’s Henry 
Luce, delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress, and was feted with a parade in 
New York City. This marked the pinnacle of Diem’s popularity in the United States; 
Luce’s Life magazine defended Diem’s decision not to hold unif cation elections by 
saying: “Diem saved his people from this agonizing prospect simply by refusing to 
permit the plebiscite and thereby he avoided national suicide.”68 
James Arnold writes of Eisenhower that “once having established American pol-
icy toward Vietnam, after mid-1955 he played a diminished role.” Diem’s successes 
in 1955 and Eisenhower’s heart attack later that year led the president to concentrate 
on other issues. The course was set by that time: the United States had taken over 
the training of South Vietnam’s military, SEATO was on its way to fruition, and the 
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administration had decided to f ght reunifcation elections. The belief continued 
to be that Diem had created a “miracle” in spring 1955 and that the country was 
coming along reasonably well.69 
That belief was not seriously shaken by the Caravelle Manifesto in April 1960, 
or a coup attempt later in the year. The manifesto was named for the hotel where 
a group of prominent anti-Communist South Vietnamese met; eleven were former 
cabinet members, and several had been considered by the Eisenhower administration 
to head a new government in spring 1955. The manifesto indicted “anti-democratic 
elections,” “continuous arrests,” and the power given to Diem’s “family.” Gibbons 
called it “a frank and compelling statement of the problems facing Vietnam, and an 
urgent appeal to Diem to take corrective action.” No newspaper in South Vietnam 
would print the manifesto for fear of Diem’s retribution, and the story was ignored 
by the US press. Diem reacted by waiting for six months before arresting many of 
the signers.70 
The coup attempt occurred in November 1960 and came close to succeeding. The 
leaders did not want to depose Diem; they merely sought political reform. Mansf eld 
cabled Diem, their fnal extant correspondence: “deeply concerned by diff culties in 
Viet Nam but relieved to learn that you are safe and well and in a position to deal 
with wisdom and compassion with the diffculties in a way which will preserve Viet 
Nam’s integrity and contribute to your country’s continuing growth and freedom.” 
Professor Fishel wrote Mansf eld on the same day, talking of the excessive power of 
Diem’s immediate family that led to hostility and contributed to the coup. Fishel 
added: 
This revolt should serve as a signal to Ngo that there is a serious unrest in the 
country; one hopes that he will react by making reforms, in his administration, 
rather than accepting advice which he is certain to be offered by certain of his 
aides, to the effect that the solution to the problem is increased repression.71 
Fishel’s hopes were not realized, as Diem reacted to the coup attempt and other 
changing circumstances with increased repression, leaving non-Communist nation-
alists with few choices. In discussing the Ngo oligarchy, the Pentagon Papers claim 
that “Diem alienated one after another of the key groups within South Vietnam’s 
society until, by late 1960, his regime rested on the narrow and disintegrating base 
of its own bureaucracy and the northern refugees,” most of whom were Catholic. 
Starting in spring 1959, Communist guerilla attacks had resumed in earnest in 
South Vietnam.72 Eisenhower, in perhaps his most lengthy formal public discussion 
and defense of US policy to that point, delivered an address at Gettysburg College on 
April 4, 1959, titled “The Importance of Understanding.” Ike was adamant: 
Unassisted, Viet-Nam cannot at this time produce and support the military 
formations essential to it, or, equally important, the morale—the hope, the con-
fdence, the pride—necessary to meet the dual threat of aggression from without 
and subversion within its borders. 
Strategically, South Viet-Nam’s capture by the Communists would bring 
their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining 
countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by a great f anking movement. 
The freedom of twelve million people would be lost immediately, and that of 
150 million others in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss 
of South Viet-Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it 
progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom. 
We reach the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
some help from us in sustaining in Viet-Nam the morale, the economic progress, TO VIETNAM 
and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom.73 
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That summer, six American advisers in Bien Hoa were watching a movie after 
dinner when Viet Minh guerillas opened f re through a window, killing Major Dale 
R. Buis, Master Sergeant Chester M. Ovnand, two South Vietnamese guards, and a 
Vietnamese child. Buis and Ovnand are the frst two names inscribed on the Vietnam 
War Memorial. In December 1960, the Communists formed a political arm, the Na-
tional Liberation Front (NLF), inviting non-Communists to join, and many did. By 
the end of the Eisenhower administration, what the Diem government and Ameri-
cans pejoratively called the Vietcong (meaning Vietnamese Communists) controlled 
large areas of the countryside, and 85 percent of Vietnam was rural. Vietnam was a 
growing concern. Yet John F. Kennedy assumed offce believing that the real problem 
in Indochina was in Laos, not in South Vietnam.74 
John F. Kennedy and Competing Tensions, 1961–1963 
When John Kennedy became president in 1961, there were “about 800 advisors in 
Vietnam, a number that had not changed signifcantly since 1955.”75 By the time he 
was assassinated in November 1963, there were over sixteen thousand.76 Kennedy 
increased “U.S. commitment in an effort to prevent South Vietnam from being over-
run by Communists, as well as to demonstrate to the Soviets, in particular, that the 
United States was going to “stand frm throughout the world” against “Communist-
led ‘wars of national liberation.’”77 Compared to other hot spots like Berlin, the Bay 
of Pigs, and the nuclear confrontation over Cuba, Vietnam was not a main foreign 
policy concern for the Kennedy administration, yet his role in Southeast Asia was 
“unsurprisingly the most controversial aspect of his public image and record.”78 
Kennedy “never delivered a major address about Vietnam” during his presi-
dency.79 But Congressman and Senator Kennedy did speak about the region. This 
early rhetoric and his subsequent presidential decision-making were marked by the 
competing tensions of viewing this struggle as one of stopping Communist expan-
sion in Southeast Asia while simultaneously recognizing the problems and com-
plexities of the region. 
Even before his remarks to the AFV referred to previously, a 1951 “fact-f nding 
mission to the Middle and Far East” convinced Congressman John Kennedy that 
failure to defend freedom in Southeast Asia would lead to its domination by Com-
munist China. Yet he “clearly disagreed with the methods the French employed,” 
and believed that their “anachronistic colonialist mentality” had blinded them “to 
the nationalistic aspirations of the native peoples of the region.”80 In a radio address 
given after his return, Kennedy presciently warned that the “complexities of Southeast 
Asia . . . called for particular policies.” While it was necessary “to check the south-
ern drive of Communism,” this could not be accomplished solely through military 
means. “The task is, rather, to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within 
these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense. To do this apart from and in 
def ance of, innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.”81 However, even
while questioning the wisdom of their policies, Kennedy “supported funding the 
French war in Indochina, asserting that the United States must prevent ‘the onrush-
ing tide of Communism from engulfng all Asia’.’”82 The competing complexities 
during this period of his political career evinced tensions that “foreshadowed John 
Kennedy’s presidential rhetoric on Vietnam.”83 
WORLD WAR II AND 
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Search for Direction, 1961 
Kennedy came to the presidency “more interested in foreign affairs than domestic 
and the bulk of his presidential time, talent and energy was consumed with global 
concerns.”84 Vietnam had been barely mentioned during the presidential campaign. 
After several briefngs by CIA director Allen Dulles, the president-elect frst met with 
Eisenhower on December 6, 1960, to discuss several foreign policy issues, but Viet-
nam was not among them.85 Their second meeting was on January 19, 1961, the day 
before the inauguration. At this meeting it was stated that if a political settlement 
could not be reached in Laos, “the United States must intervene in concert with our 
allies. If we are unable to persuade our allies, then we must go it alone.” Clark Clif-
ford, an adviser to the president-elect during the campaign, wrote that the warning 
came as a surprise and “had a powerful effect on Kennedy, [Secretary of State Dean] 
Rusk, [Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara, and me.”86 
The Eisenhower administration had opposed Laotian prince Souvanna Phou-
ma’s attempts to create a neutralist government in Laos, and supported right-wing, 
pro-Western general Phoumi Nosavan. The Soviets, in turn, supported the Pathet Lao 
(Communist) and Prince Souvanna’s neutralist forces. Kennedy inherited a civil war 
between the factions, and in February and March 1961 spent a great deal of time on 
this issue. 
Much of the opening statement at the news conference of March 23, 1961, fo-
cused on what Kennedy called the “diffcult and potentially dangerous problem” of 
Laos. Kennedy stated that he and General Eisenhower had “spent more time on this 
hard matter than on any other thing. And since then it has been steadily before the 
administration as the most immediate of the problems that we found upon taking 
offce.” Having established its importance and the bipartisan nature of his concerns, 
Kennedy used a series of maps to illustrate that since “the last half of 1960,” the 
Pathet Lao had “turned to a new and intensifed military effort to take over” with 
“increasing support and direction from outside.” He stated that “we strongly and un-
reservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos,” and addressed spe-
cifcally that “if in the past there has been any possible ground for misunderstanding 
of our desire of a truly neutral Laos, there should be none now.” This position “has 
been carefully considered and we have sought to make it just as clear as we know 
how to the governments concerned.” Kennedy argued that a peaceful solution would 
require a cessation of Pathet Lao aggression. He warned that if the attacks did not 
stop, “those who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response. 
. . . No one should doubt our resolutions on this point.” Finally, Kennedy explained 
the stakes in Laos to an American audience that was becoming well-versed in the 
domino theory: “The security of all Southeast Asia will be endangered if Laos loses 
its neutral independence. Its own safety runs with the safety of us all.”87 
Kennedy returned to this last topic in response to a question concerning the 
“national unawareness of the importance of a free Laos to the security of the United 
States and to the individual American.” The president pointed out that Laos bor-
dered both Thailand (“to which the United States has treaty obligations under the 
SEATO Agreement of 1954”) and South Vietnam (“to which the United States has 
very close ties”). Thus, given its strategic location, “If the Communists were able to 
move in and dominate this country, it would endanger the security of all, and the 
peace of all, of Southeast Asia.” As a “country which is concerned with the strength 
and cause of freedom around the world, that quite obviously affects the security of 
the United States.”88 Ultimately, Kennedy did not intervene militarily in Laos, and in 
May the three factions began negotiations in Geneva. In July 1962, a fragile coalition 
government was established.89 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
One reason JFK did not intervene in Laos was the Bay of Pigs fasco that oc- TO VIETNAM 
curred in mid-April. Kennedy was persuaded to implement a plan developed in the 
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Eisenhower administration to allow Cuban refugees, trained and supplied by the 
CIA, to invade Cuba; according to Mann, the military “virtually guaranteed” success.
Kennedy lost confdence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff after the Bay of Pigs. Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy and JFK adviser Ted Sorensen believed that without the 
failure in Cuba, the president might have intervened in Laos. Kennedy later said to 
Sorensen, “Thank God the Bay of Pigs happened when it did. Otherwise, we’d be in 
Laos by now—and that would be a hundred times worse.” The Cuban failure and the 
perceived loss in Laos over the neutrality compromise led adviser Walt Rostow to tell 
the president, “Vietnam is the place, where . . . we must prove that we are not a paper 
tiger.” This was reinforced by William Bundy’s observation that Kennedy’s “decision 
to compromise in Laos made it essential to convey by word and deed that the US 
would stand frm in South Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia.”90 
This attitude was reinforced by other events during 1961. Just before Kennedy’s 
inauguration, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev “publicly advocated a policy in 
which wars of national liberation would commence in earnest,”91 the Soviet Union 
successfully put a man in space just before the disaster at the Bay of Pigs, and Ken-
nedy was “sobered and shook” by Khrushchev’s attempt to “intimidate” him at the 
Vienna summit. After the meeting, Kennedy admitted to James Reston of the New 
York Times, “Now we have a problem in making our power credible, and Vietnam 
looks like the place.”92 Later in the year, the Berlin crisis occurred. Each of these 
events placed pressure on the new president for a success, and the likely place for 
such a victory looked like it would have to be in South Vietnam. 
Shortly after assuming offce Kennedy received General Edward Lansdale’s nega-
tive report following his visit to South Vietnam. Lansdale described “Vietnam as a 
combat area of the cold war . . . requiring emergency treatment.”93 “Shocked” at 
the amount of Vietcong activity, he found South Vietnam to be in “critical condi-
tion” and his old friend Diem to be in serious trouble. Kennedy said to Rostow: 
“This is the worst one we’ve got, isn’t it? You know, Eisenhower never mentioned 
it. He talked at length about Laos, but never uttered the word Vietnam.” Following 
the meeting, Kennedy made his frst presidential decision on Vietnam by approv-
ing a counterinsurgency plan for the area.94 Some have suggested that Lansdale’s 
report launched “the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policy.”95 From that point 
forward, the new administration would increase the number of US personnel in 
South Vietnam and pour money into supporting Diem’s government, even though it 
meant openly circumventing the 1954 Geneva Accords.96 
In the spring and fall of 1961, as part of his effort to understand the problems 
presented by Vietnam, the president dispatched several fact-fnding missions. In 
retrospect it seems as though each mission highlighted the increasing complexities 
of the situation while simultaneously providing a rationale for increased commit-
ment by restating the negative consequences that would attend the presumed loss
of Vietnam. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric led the frst mission on 
April 20; Lansdale and Walt Rostow were among its members. Their charge was to 
propose measures to “prevent Communist domination” of Vietnam. Their report rec-
ommended higher levels of US funding to increase the size of the South Vietnamese 
military and more US trainers to work with the South Vietnamese army, including 
army Green Berets. Gilpatric’s report faced some opposition from members of the ad-
ministration, including Rusk, but Kennedy approved much of it. Presidential adviser 
William Bundy later said that the administration “was impregnated with the belief” 
that Communism “was on the offensive . . . and that it must now be met solidly.”97 
At a May 5, 1961, press conference the president announced that he had asked 
“Vice President Johnson to undertake a special fact-fnding mission to Asia.” At that 
same news conference when asked about sending American troops to Vietnam, 
Kennedy replied that the United States was ready “to assist Viet-Nam to obtain its 
independence,” but this was “a matter still under consideration.” The vice president 
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would be consulting with “the Government of Viet-Nam as to what further steps 
could most usefully be taken.”98 
The purpose of the vice president’s mission to Saigon was to “aff rm and pro-
mote the U.S. commitment[,] . . . extract more of a commitment from Vietnam,” and 
provide Kennedy with a sense of distance even though the White House “control[led] 
every important aspect of [the] trip.”99 Johnson presented Diem with a presidential 
letter “that pledged U.S. readiness to join with you in an intensifed endeavor to 
win the struggle against communism.”100 In a speech before the national assembly 
of South Vietnam Johnson assured Diem that “the United States stands ready to 
assist in meeting the grave situation which confronts you” and later praised him 
as the “Churchill of Asia.”101 Some seized on this comment as a reason to ridicule 
Johnson’s trip, but he had “been directed to laud Diem and his accomplishments,” 
in order to “create in [him] a higher sense of his own importance in the eyes of the 
United States and the world.”102 As Stanley Karnow observed, by this point off cial 
policy was that, “whatever Diem’s shortcomings, the United States would ‘sink or 
swim’ with him.”103 
Diem and the vice president discussed the “key question being considered in 
Washington,”104 the possibility of introducing more American troops into Vietnam. 
Diem “responded unenthusiastically” to this idea,105 worried that more American 
troops “would compromise his nationalist reputation and give credence to the Com-
munist slogan ‘My-Diem,’ or American Diem.” He did not “want U.S. troops to f ght 
in his country except in the case of overt aggression against South Vietnam,” but he 
would welcome American troops for the purposes of training his army.106 On May 
13 a joint communiqué was issued stating that the United States recognized “its 
responsibility and duty, in its own self-interest as well as the interests of other free 
peoples, to assist a brave country in the defense of its liberties against unprovoked 
subversion and Communist terror,” and lauded Diem as “in the vanguard of those 
leaders who stand for freedom on the periphery of the Communist empire.”107 
Johnson’s report maintained that the “battle against Communism must be 
joined in Southeast Asia . . . or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the 
Pacifc and take up our defenses on our own shores.” Further, there was “no alterna-
tive to United States leadership in Southeast Asia. Leadership in individual countries 
. . . rests on the knowledge, and faith in United States power, will and understand-
ing.”108 Vietnam and Thailand were the most immediate and important “trouble 
spots critical to the U.S. . . . The basic decision in Southeast Asia is here. We must 
decide whether to help these countries . . . or throw in the towel in the area and 
pull back our defenses to San Francisco and a ‘Fortress America’ concept. More im-
portant, we would say to the world in this case that we don’t live up to treaties and 
don’t stand by our friends.” Johnson observed that Diem “has admirable qualities, 
but he is remote from the people [and] is surrounded by persons less admirable and 
capable than he. The country can be saved—if we move quickly and wisely. We must 
decide whether to support Diem—or let Vietnam fall.” Johnson “fnessed the ticklish 
problem of U.S. combat troops”109 with his observation that “Asian leaders—at this 
time—do not want American troops involved in Southeast Asia other than on train-
ing missions. American combat troop involvement is not only not required, it is not 
desirable.” 
In retrospect the vice president’s report highlights the tension that marks the 
rhetoric of this time. It recognized the problems with the Diem government, but still 
offered the simple bifurcated choice of making a stand in Southeast Asia or retreat-
ing into “fortress America.” A stand in Southeast Asia meant making that stand in 
Vietnam, and Vietnam necessitated “supporting Diem despite his faws.” Thus did 
Johnson’s report reinforce “the enhanced commitment of the United States to the THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
South Vietnamese” and affrm “the strategic logic of American commitment and the TO VIETNAM 
policy strategies being employed in South Vietnam.”110 
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Shortly after Johnson’s visit there was an “upsurge in Viet Cong attacks,” which 
“continued to build into a countrywide offensive during the summer and fall of 
1961.”111 These attacks led Diem to say that he would welcome the “symbolic pres-
ence” of more American combat soldiers. Through the summer and fall many of 
Kennedy’s advisers and the Joint Chiefs pressed for more combat troops to convince 
the Communists “that the United States would not accept defeat.”112 Kennedy did 
not support an increased military presence, and against this backdrop, he “sent Max-
well Taylor to Saigon on a crucial mission.”113 
At the time of the Taylor mission—which included Walt Rostow and Edward 
Lansdale—it was clear “that the battlefeld situation in South Vietnam was fast ap-
proaching the critical point” and this “unfavorable news [had] found its way into 
the newspapers”114 Taylor’s entourage toured South Vietnam for ten days and briefed 
President Kennedy on November 3. Like the Johnson report, Taylor’s was “guided 
by an unquestioning acceptance of the domino theory.” Taylor, Rostow, and the 
others did not see the war in Vietnam as an internal struggle between nationalism 
and colonialism, but concluded that ‘the Communists are pursuing a clear and 
systematic strategy in Southeast Asia.”115 The fnal report—written by Taylor him-
self—“recommended that up to 8,000 [combat troops] be sent, that more be sent 
if necessary, and most important, that the job could not be done without them.”116 
Taylor argued that the “chances of a South Vietnamese victory would be ‘substan-
tially improved if Americans are prepared to work side by side with the Vietnamese 
on the key problems.’” In practical terms this meant “a drastic increase in the level of 
American involvement” and a “radical increase of U.S. trainers at every level, as well 
as additional special forces.”117 
Taylor’s report “triggered a sharp debate in Washington,” where few “cared much 
for the half-in, half-out nature of the proposal.”118 Secretary of Defense McNamara 
spoke for those favoring a more pronounced American role when he observed that 
the recommendation to send a “relatively small number” of American troops would 
“not convince anyone of our resolve.”119 Others “voiced strong opposition to direct 
military intervention.” Among these were Averell Harriman, Douglas MacArthur II, 
Senate majority leader Mike Mansfeld, and Richard Russell, “the ranking member of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee.”120 Among those most concerned about intro-
ducing more American troops into Vietnam was the president, who was “shocked by 
Taylor’s recommendation to send 8,000 combat troops to Vietnam,”121 and viewed 
the prospect as dangerous. The president planted “misleading stories” in the media 
that “stated fatly that Kennedy was opposed to sending combat troops to Vietnam 
and strongly implied that Taylor had not recommended doing so.”122 But despite 
Kennedy’s “aversion to the Taylor troop recommendation, a Communist victory in 
Vietnam seemed equally unacceptable.”123 
The issue of how far to “commit” dominated concern over Vietnam in 1961. 
Fact-fnding missions were dispatched to try to fnd a way to resolve what was per-
ceived as a choice between unpalatable options. Kennedy was reluctant to commit 
more troops, but fretted over the prospect of losing the country to the growing 
Communist insurgency. The introduction of US combat forces could save the Sai-
gon government but would change the entire nature of the confict. There was also 
pronounced concern that Diem’s regime was ineffective and out of touch with much 
of the country. The issue was settled on November 22, 1961, with  National Security 
Action Memorandum No. 111 (NSAM-111). It did not authorize the introduction of 
American combat forces, but it did grant “a signifcant increase in American advisors 
and equipment.”124 Although holding an important line, this decision made the 
United States 
an active partner in the struggle against the Viet-Cong [and] was a major step 
in the country’s steady progression toward total intervention. Although the 
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president stopped short of committing a specifc number of combat personnel 
to the fght, NASM-111 actually made the commitment open-ended and almost 
guaranteed that the number of U.S. uniformed personnel in South Vietnam 
would rise steadily as the military situation deteriorated. In effect, Kennedy had 
unlocked the door to eventual full-scale involvement.125 
Kennedy had “deepened the American commitment consistently and consider-
ably during 1961 without any adequate discussion of the problem.” In Vietnam this 
meant “business as usual” in Saigon, and an “unchecked growth of the insurgency 
in the countryside.”126 
At a news conference on November 29, 1961, the president stated that the goal 
of American actions in Vietnam was “to permit the Vietnamese people to control 
their destiny.” We were working with the Saigon government to “increase the sense 
of commitment by the people of Viet-nam to the struggle.”127 On December 15, 
1961, Kennedy released a public letter in response to Diem’s plea for additional sup-
port. JFK pledged: “We are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its 
people and to preserve its independence. We shall promptly increase our assistance 
to your defense effort.”128 One week later, on December 22, 1961, Army Specialist 
Fourth Class James T. Davis was killed in a f refght, the “frst American to die in open 
combat with the Viet Cong.”129 
Optimism, January 1962–May 1963 
The “dark picture of the war” that marked the latter part of 1961 was replaced by “the 
success story in early 1962.”130 Much of that year was marked by “optimistic reports 
about the progress of the U. S. military effort” in Vietnam and continued political 
support of Diem.131 Indeed as US Ambassador to South Vietnam Frederick Nolting 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The best way to win, the best way to 
maintain the independence of South Vietnam is to give [Diem’s] government full 
backing.”132 
By February the newly created Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) 
was offering “rosy portrayals of the struggle against the Viet Cong.”133 The war had 
taken a “turn for the better. The infux of American advisors and equipment boosted 
the moral of the South Vietnamese troops,”134 and Diem was “gradually, but surely 
winning the confdence and loyalty of the South Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong 
were on the run, [and] Diem’s American-backed army appeared to be winning.”135 
Much of the optimism “about developments in Vietnam in 1962 was related to 
the strategic hamlet program,”136 “the “heart of U.S.-South Vietnamese counterinsur-
gency strategy.”137 The aim of the plan was to “corral peasants into armed stockades, 
thereby depriving the Vietcong of their support,”138 and it appealed on several lev-
els. For Saigon it “extended the government’s infuence down to the smallest unit 
of Vietnamese society,” allowing Diem to “politically contest the Viet Cong.” For 
Americans it “dovetailed with prevailing counterinsurgency theories” that focused 
on the necessity of “cutting the Viet Cong off from their local sources of strength, 
i.e. by denying them access to the villages and the people.”139 In January 1963, the 
JCS reported “that two thirds of the rural population . . . were ‘safely tucked away’ in 
strategic hamlets.”140 Kennedy mentioned the success of the program as one reason 
why the “tunnel” of Vietnam was “in some ways lighter” than it had been.141 Indeed 
the “dominant view in 1962 and 1963 was that the strategic hamlet was the best 
hope for . . . defeating the Viet Cong insurgency.”142 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
However, reports about the success of the strategic hamlet program differed TO VIETNAM 
greatly from its reality. Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu viewed it as “essentially 
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a means to spread their infuence rather than a device to infuse peasants with the 
will to resist the Vietcong.” While administration members “hailed the program,” 
their enthusiasm for it “mainly refected a yearning at the upper echelons of the 
U.S. establishment for positive signs.”143 The forced relocation of rural peasants to 
“concentration-camp like villages undermined the already materially weak govern-
ment authority and supported the ever-growing Viet Cong organization.”144 
Indeed much of the “progress” during this period “was largely an illusion as 
MACV offcials processed and fed only positive information to administration of-
fcials, who eagerly accepted it as accurate and objective.”145 There is evidence that 
Kennedy “had come to believe the perception delivered by the uninterrupted string 
of false reports emanating from Vietnam.”146 Indeed, he told dinner attendees that 
the world looked better in September 1962 than when he took off ce and “the pic-
ture was dreary [and] [t]he tide was running against us in Vietnam.”147 
There were however, other narratives that suggested that the situation in Viet-
nam was less than optimal. Although the press offered wide coverage concerning 
the doctrine of counterinsurgency—“the organizing principle of U.S. policy in South 
Vietnam in 1962”148—journalists also reported much that differed widely from the 
offcial accounts. While the administration sought to “portray U.S. involvement as 
strictly a noble effort to aid a valued ally, many American journalists reported the 
darker side of the confict. Where military and embassy press attaches announced 
outstanding success, they reported failure; where Diem and his brother Nhu were 
shown building ‘democracy’ in the South Vietnamese countryside, they reported 
repression and widespread discontent.”149 
This led to a concern for how truthful the administration was being about 
Vietnam. The president’s statement at a January 15, 1962, press conference that 
American troops were not engaged in combat,150 was countered less than a month 
later when James Reston stated on the editorial page of the New York Times that the 
“United States is now involved in an undeclared war in South Vietnam. This is well 
known to the Russians, the Chinese Communists, and everybody else concerned ex-
cept the American people.”151 Newsweek followed with suggestions that the American 
military was concealing “the extent of U.S. involvement in the combat areas,”152 and 
the Republican National Committee suggested that the administration had been 
“less than candid” concerning the level of “United States involvement in the f ghting 
in South Vietnam.”153 When asked about this in a February news conference, the 
president stated that he had “discussed this matter . . . with the leadership of the 
Republicans and Democrats when we met in early January and informed them of 
what we were doing in Viet-Nam.” Further, “[Secretary of State] Rusk has discussed it 
with the House and Senate Foreign Affairs Committee,” and “[Secretary of Defense] 
McNamara has discussed it with the Armed Services Committee.”154 
Others challenged what appeared to be the administration’s policy of unques-
tioned support for Diem. The editors of the New Republic identifed this problem 
when they wrote that America had “capitulated to Diem and has bound itself to 
the defense of a client regime without exacting on its part sacrifces necessary for 
success.”155 In so doing Washington “deprived itself slowly but surely of all freedom 
of maneuver.” It handed Diem “a blank check . . . without asking for any hard and 
fast commitments in return.”156 As Mann observed, it was a “vicious cycle. In order 
to ‘save’ South Vietnam from collapse, the United States could not afford to wait 
for Diem to move toward reform. Yet precisely because the Americans did not wait 
for or demand those reforms, Diem believed he could casually ignore advice and 
criticism from [Ambassador] Nolting and other U.S. off cials.”157 US Ambassador to 
India John Kenneth Galbraith also “considered the Diem government a disaster and 
feared the U.S. was replacing the French as the colonial military force in the area.”158 
In an April 4 memorandum he suggested that the United States should “measurably 
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reduce our commitment to the particular present leadership of South Viet-Nam,” 
while keeping “open the door for a political solution.”159 
In the Congress “Vietnam was still a minor problem in 1962, and one better 
left to the president and his State Department.” Oregon’s Wayne Morse was the 
only senator to express his opposition on the foor of the Senate, indicating that “he 
believed America’s military adventure was an outright mistake.” But his “concerns 
fell on deaf ears.”160 Another senator expressing concern was Mike Mansf eld—an 
authority on Asia and early supporter of Diem. Mansfeld had “started sending cau-
tionary memos to Kennedy about the Indochinese situation in January 1961,”161 but 
believing it was his duty as majority leader to support the president, had “remained 
mostly silent” in public while discussing his concerns privately with Kennedy.162 His 
public silence was broken in June 1962 when he told the audience at Michigan State 
University’s graduation that “events appear to be moving in Southeast Asia towards 
a point of critical decision,” direly predicting that “at worst, we must be prepared 
for a possible confict of indefnite depth and duration, dependent largely on our 
forces for its prosecution.”163 He “challenged the Cold War orthodoxy” that the fate 
of Southeast Asia linked directly to American security.164 While Kennedy agreed with 
much of Mansfeld’s critique, his “continued belief in the domino theory” led him 
to conclude that American withdrawal from Vietnam “might mean a collapse of 
the entire area,” and “Mansfeld’s temperate dissent made little news in the United 
States.”165 
At the end of 1962 Mansfeld made—at the request of President Kennedy—a 
fact-fnding visit to Vietnam, his frst since 1955.166 On December 26 he discussed 
his fndings with the president. While “acknowledging the optimism and enthusi-
asm of South Vietnamese and Americans,”167 Mansfeld predicted that victory would 
only be possible with “improvement from the South Vietnamese.”168 Indeed the situ-
ation in Vietnam had “deteriorated signifcantly since 1954,” rural areas “remained 
insecure, Diem had grown older and more tired, and Nhu . . . was stepping into the 
breach.” Mansfeld predicted that if the “anti-guerrilla offensive and the strategic 
hamlet program failed . . . the United States would face pressure to take over the war 
itself.”169 
In his report to the president, Mansfeld reiterated an important point he had 
made at Michigan State: Vietnam was only “‘desirable’ to our national interests.” To
continue to state publicly that it was “essential or vital” could lead to increasing the 
American role there.170 Thus Mansfeld was suggesting that Kennedy’s domino-theory 
rhetoric—as much as anything else—was defning Vietnam as more important to 
American interests than it really was, and creating a situation that could lead to deeper 
American involvement. At a press conference in March 1963, Kennedy was asked 
about Mansfeld’s recommendation to conduct “a thorough security reassessment in 
the Far East and . . . a [possible] reduction in our aid to that part of the world.” The 
president replied that that would not be possible without “pull[ing] out of Southeast 
Asia and turn[ing] it over to the Communists. . . . [U]nless you want to withdraw from 
the feld and decide that it is in the national interest to permit that area to collapse, I 
would think that it would be impossible to substantially change it.”171 
During this time the president evidently felt he needed to encourage Americans 
to continue their role in the vital effort to stop the spread of Communism. While 
he recognized that the “heavy burden” was fatiguing, no one “should regret” it. “If 
we fail the whole cause of freedom fails.” Indeed, “When the history of this age is 
written . . . however tired and burdensome it may now seem—that is the record for 
which we will be remembered.”172 Americans were the “keystone in the whole arch 
of the whole fght for freedom.” Vietnam was an important part of that effort, and 
Americans were there “fghting and in some cases dying for the maintenance of other THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
countries’ freedom as well as their own.”173 TO VIETNAM 
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Kennedy told the 1962 class at West Point that they would face demands “more 
pressing, and in many ways more burdensome, as well as more challenging than ever 
before in our history,” as they helped those “countries which are heavily engaged in 
the maintenance of their freedom.”174 He made the same point in December during 
an interview retrospective about his f rst two years in off ce: “The willingness of the 
United States to accept burdens all around the world, I think is a fantastic story. We 
have one million Americans serving outside of their own country. There is no other 
country in history that has carried this kind of a burden.”175 
In his 1963 State of the Union message JFK observed that the United States 
had “maintained the frontiers of freedom from Viet-Nam to Berlin” and that “the 
spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in Viet-Nam.”176 The president’s budget 
message labeled “Vietnam’s continuing struggle against massive armed subversion 
supported from without” a reminder of the “need and importance” of American 
assistance in the effort “to promote the security of the free world.”177 Thus Kennedy’s 
public rhetoric was grounded in the idea that American efforts in Vietnam were an 
essential and vital element of the defense of freedom and security in the world. As 
he stated in an April 1963 message to Congress, “Around the world cracks in the 
monolithic apparatus of our adversary are there for all to see. This, for the American 
people, is a time for vision, for patience, for work and for wisdom. For better or 
worse, we are the pacesetters. Freedom’s leader cannot fag or falter, or another run-
ner will set the pace.” And the president issued a familiar warning: “Freedom—all 
freedom, including our own—is diminished when other countries fall under Com-
munist domination.”178 This basic truth undergirded JFK’s rhetoric during this time. 
It was poignantly illustrated when he told the story of writing to the sister of an 
American serviceman who was killed in Vietnam and “who wondered whether her 
brother’s sacrifce had been worthwhile. . . . I wrote to her . . . that in the service that 
he rendered for the defense of that far-off country, he was defending the United 
States and its freedom.”179 
A Change in Direction, May–November 1963 
Orrin Schwab observed that the “period between the drafting of NSAM-111 in No-
vember 1961 and the South Vietnamese coup of November 1963 was marked by the 
illusion of progress in the new Kennedy policy. The expansion of military assistance 
in the context of “counterinsurgency” doctrine suggested that the war was being won; 
that America’s involvement in Vietnam would remain limited because there would 
be no need to go further. This assessment was widely held until the disturbing events 
of the summer and fall of 1963 showed otherwise—the policy had failed.”180 On 
November 1, 1963, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were killed in a coup that 
“ripped away the façade of progress and legitimacy in the South Vietnamese state”181 
and probably “accelerated the Americanization of the Vietnam War.”182 
Upon returning from Saigon in the summer of 1962 Joseph Mendenhall ob-
served that security in Vietnam had deteriorated and that “Diem and Nhu would 
never change.” The United States should “get rid of Diem, Mr. and Mrs. Nhu and 
the rest of the Ngo family” by “encouraging a military coup.”183 Mendenhall’s report 
was kept secret, but support for getting rid of Diem “had existed on different levels 
of the U.S. government since the last year of the Eisenhower administration,”184 and 
by the summer of 1963 support for Diem in Washington had declined drastically.185 
The case for allowing Diem to be removed was made starkly clear by the “Bud-
dhist crisis” of 1963. In Hue on May 8, 1963, a group demonstrated for the “right to 
fy Buddhist fags on Buddha’s birthday.”186 When several thousand gathered to hear 
a speech by a Buddhist leader, they were ordered to disperse. When they did not, the 
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deputy province chief ordered his men to open fre and several people were killed. 
The Diem government denied any responsibility and said that those who died were 
killed in the panic that ensued after a terrorist attack by the Vietcong. 
Although the incident was lightly reported in the United States, it mobilized the 
Buddhists and “quickly became the rallying point of opposition to Diem’s autocratic 
and repressive rule.”187 Thus began the “Buddhist crisis” that would continue through 
the summer and into the fall. The situation was not helped by Diem’s sister-in law 
Madam Nhu, who displayed her “unfailing instinct for the wrong word at the wrong 
time,”188 and enraged “the Buddhist leaders by issuing a statement that denounced 
them as Communist dupes.”189 
Interestingly, the “full gravity of the situation” was not yet recognized by the 
Americans. William Bundy called May 1963 “the most optimistic time period” of 
the entire American intervention. The “sincere optimism of large numbers of govern-
ment offcials and military offcers did not change through the summer and into 
the fall of 1963, even as the Diem regime’s political problems grew more and more 
critical. Military, Defense Department, CIA and some State representatives could not 
help but to express confdence in the progress of the war and the pacif cation ef-
fort.”190 Indeed, after getting Diem to make some concessions after the incident in 
Hue, Ambassador Nolting left “Vietnam on May 23, 1963 for a sailing vacation in 
the Aegean.”191 His deputy, William Trueheart, took a much harder line with Diem.192 
In the beginning the Buddhists “consigned themselves to marches and peaceful 
gatherings,” but by June, it was “obvious that these protests were having no impact” 
and the media “had lost interest completely.” On June 11, 1963, while “300 Buddhist 
monks and nuns blocked all entrances to a main intersection in Saigon,” Buddhist 
monk Thich Quang Duc “sat in the lotus position and allowed fellow monks to pour 
[a] combustible mixture over him. . . . [He] struck a match and was immediately 
engulfed in f ames.”193 The act was photographed by Malcolme Browne and was on 
the front page of papers around the world the next day. When interviewed about the 
incident by CBS, Madame Nhu said that all “the so-called ‘Buddhist leaders’ [had] 
done is to barbeque a bonze” (a Buddhist monk)194 
As presented in the American media, the struggle was religious in nature, “be-
tween a Roman Catholic and Buddhists.”195 Diem’s Catholicism — the very thing 
that had made him relatable to American politicians in the 1950s—isolated him in 
a country where Buddhists were the vast majority. The American government issued 
“both public and private warnings to the South Vietnamese that the spectacle of 
religious oppression was intolerable. The United States made clear it was dissociating 
itself from the actions of the Republic of Vietnam vis-à-vis its Buddhist citizens.”196 
During that summer “Vietnam began to attract Kennedy’s daily attention for the 
frst time in his presidency.”197 Asked at a July 17, press conference if the Buddhist 
crisis impeded the war, the president replied that it did, and lamented that it was 
“unfortunate” that it had “arisen at the very time when the military struggle has been 
going better than it has been in many months.” He hoped that the Vietnamese could 
“reach an agreement on the civil disturbances and also on respect for the rights of 
others.” But, he said, “the decision is f nally theirs.”198 
During the crisis Kennedy continued to emphasize the importance that Saigon’s 
decisions would have in the war effort. In an interview with Walter Cronkite on CBS, 
Kennedy stated that the war in Vietnam could not be won “unless a greater effort is 
made by the Government to win popular support. . . . In the fnal analysis, it is their 
war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give 
them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win 
it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the Communists.” The Saigon government had 
“gotten out of touch with the people” in the last two months, and he was trying to THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
“make it very clear” that repression of the Buddhists was “very unwise” and not “the TO VIETNAM 
way to win.” There was still time “to regain the support of the people,” with “changes 
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in policy and . . . personnel,” without which the chances of winning “would not be 
very good.” When Cronkite observed that all indications suggested that Diem had 
“no intention of changing his pattern,” the president restated that “our best judg-
ment is that he can’t be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that, 
but in the f nal analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win 
or lose this struggle.” He nonetheless maintained that it “would be a great mistake” 
to withdraw from the area. The “defense of Asia was “a very important struggle even 
though it is far away.”199 
Kennedy reinforced this idea a week later in an interview with David Huntley 
and Chet Brinkley of NBC. When Huntley asked about “our diffculties in South 
Viet-Nam,” the president stated that although “the struggle against the Communists 
was going better,” there had been “diffculties with the Buddhists” since June. He ob-
served that he had “to deal with the government [that was] there” but was trying to 
persuade it “to take those steps which will win back support.” Kennedy stated that it 
would not be “helpful at this time” to reduce aid to South Vietnam, and reconf rmed 
that he still believed that the “domino theory” was applicable in Southeast Asia.200 
All during the summer discussion proceeded “about the desirability of f nding 
a replacement for Diem.”201 Ambassador Nolting was against removing Diem and 
believed that “the most likely result of a coup attempt that succeeded in killing Diem 
was civil war.”202 While in Europe, Nolting had learned by commercial radio broad-
cast that he would be replaced as ambassador. On June 27, 1963, Kennedy named 
Henry Cabot Lodge to the post. Lodge “had earned Kennedy’s respect for his strength 
and toughness.”203 He spoke fuent French, had visited Vietnam in the 1930s as a 
reporter, and was a Republican, thus providing Kennedy a measure of “insurance 
against recrimination should Vietnam go down the drain.”204 
Nolting spent his remaining time as ambassador trying to persuade Diem to 
“take the steps necessary to resolve the Buddhist problem,” but the country’s “po-
litical fabric continued to disintegrate,” as the protests “increased in frequency and 
intensity.”205 Just before leaving Vietnam the outgoing ambassador received assur-
ances that Diem would “be conciliatory toward the Buddhists” although he “consid-
ered them subversive,”206 and protested that the Americans “understood neither the 
Buddhist problem nor his family’s selfess contributions to Vietnam.”207 Nolting left 
Vietnam on August 15, but upon his departure he publicly extolled Diem’s devotion 
to “democratic principles” and “social justice,” and asserted that he had “never seen 
any evidence of religious persecution” while in Vietnam.208 
Between “Nolting’s departure and Lodge’s arrival, the Diem regime took a des-
perate gamble to suppress the Buddhist problem once and for all. If successful the 
plan would present the new ambassador with a fait accompli.”209 On August 21, 
martial law was declared and “police and special forces loyal to Nhu” “launched a 
series of nationwide attacks against Buddhist pagodas” in cities across the country, 
and “arrested more than 1,400 Buddhist monks and nuns, stripping the movement 
of most of its leadership.”210 The United States publicly repudiated this action, and 
two days later “Vietnamese generals planning a coup against Diem made their f rst 
contact with an American representative.”211 
Lodge—en route to Vietnam and meeting with Nolting in Hawaii — went im-
mediately to Tan Son Nhut. He was told that Nhu was “responsible for the recent 
pagoda raids and that while many South Vietnamese still respected Diem, it was 
essential to get rid of Nhu.”212 It was widely believed that Diem would never allow 
that, and in an August 29 cable to Secretary of State Dean Rusk the new ambassador 
stated that “the war could not be won under a Diem administration, and that the 
U.S. therefore should support the ouster of Diem.”213 
The South Vietnamese generals who favored a coup “did not feel suff ciently 
strong and feared abandonment” as members of the administration argued over the 
proper course of action.214 Robert Kennedy remembered it as a time when division 
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among the president’s advisers was so deep that it “was the only time really, in three 
years, the government was broken in two in a very disturbing [way].”215 Some favored 
supporting a coup to get rid of Diem, others feared that such an action would result 
in a “power vacuum that would endanger the military effort against the VC. The 
Diem regime meanwhile continued arrests of Buddhists and students.”216 
Although Senators George McGovern (D-SD) and Wayne Morse voiced their 
doubts about the American course in Vietnam, most of “the leading foreign policy 
voices in Congress had fallen virtually silent during the months of September and 
October.” But there was concern that events in Vietnam would affect public opin-
ion, and the “thought of a public and a Congress growing restless over a faltering 
U.S. policy in Vietnam and the troubling divisions among his own advisors worried 
Kennedy.”217 
The president dispatched McNamara and Taylor on a fact-fnding mission to 
Southeast Asia. Their report—which some would later maintain was “misguided 
[and] contained a patently false characterization of the situation in South Vietnam” 
— “became the new guiding light of Kennedy’s Vietnam policy.”218 On October 5 the 
government began implementing its “recommendations for selective suspensions of 
aid” as a way to convey “displeasure at [Diem’s] political policies and activities and 
to create signifcant uncertainty in that government and in key Vietnamese groups 
as to future intentions of United States.”219 By the “middle of October, coup plotting 
was again in full bloom.”220 Ambassador Lodge—who “had lobbied hard for the 
coup from the time he assumed the ambassadorship in August”221—was its “primary 
cheerleader.” South Vietnamese generals moved against the Diem government on 
November 1. Diem and Nhu were murdered shortly after they surrendered. At the 
White House President Kennedy was informed of their deaths by telegram. Accord-
ing to those in attendance he went ashen and “leapt to his feet and rushed from the 
room with a look of shock and dismay on his face.”222 
In a press conference two weeks after the coup, the president said that he hoped 
the “new situation” in South Vietnam would lead to “an increased effort in the war,” 
and that our objective was to help the South Vietnamese “maintain themselves as 
a free and independent country and promote democratic forces within the country 
to operate.”223 Ambassador Lodge’s last cable to President Kennedy noted that “the 
whole trend of the [postcoup] crowd is to have warm and cordial relations with 
the American people and government.”224 Indeed on November 3, 1963, a New 
York Times editorial headlined “Opportunity in Vietnam” observed that the coup— 
“carried through by Vietnamese generals who . . . put the fate of their country above 
the fortunes of the Ngo family”—presented “the opportunity—and it may be the last 
opportunity—to establish a forward-looking democratically oriented government 
with a broad base of popular support, a government that could in fact carry the 
anti-Communist war to an ultimately successful conclusion.” If the new government 
could gain the “loyalty and support [of] the Vietnamese people” and identify “itself 
with [their] aspirations . . . it will have taken a long step toward repulsing further 
Communist inroads throughout Southeast Asia.”225 
When this editorial ran, John Kennedy had less than three weeks left in of-
fce. During his brief term he had “dramatically altered the U.S. role” in Southeast 
Asia.226 Hard questions about Vietnam’s relationship to American security interests 
were eschewed in favor of rhetoric grounded in Cold War platitudes that def ned 
that country as a critical part of the struggle between freedom and slavery. Hard 
truths about the Diem regime were avoided as the United States poured into Viet-
nam “a fow of men and material . . . that [swelled] in inverse proportion to the 
staying power of [his] regime” to which that rhetoric bound the United States.227 
This tension was put into dramatic relief when the coup illustrated that all “the THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
efforts and all the money spent on creating a separate noncommunist Vietnamese TO VIETNAM 
nation-state had failed to create a stable viable regime.”228 Long after the tragedy in 
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Dallas, the United States would reap the bitter consequences of these profoundly 
disturbing signs of failure. 
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident Leads to an LBJ Mandate, 
1963–1964 
George Herring argues: “Between November 1963 and July 1965, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson transformed a limited commitment to assist the South Vietnamese govern-
ment into an open-ended commitment to preserve an independent, non-Commu-
nist South Vietnam.”229 Unlike President Kennedy, Johnson did not enter off ce with 
a desire to focus on foreign policy. One day into his presidency, LBJ talked to some 
aides for hours about his intentions for the presidency. His goals were domestic; Viet-
nam was barely mentioned. The issue that would consume his presidency surfaced 
the following day at a meeting with his national security advisers for a brief ng by 
Henry Cabot Lodge. Ambassador Lodge reported that the South Vietnamese military 
position was deteriorating. One month later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
issued a bleak report on Vietnam: “The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, 
unless reversed in the next 2–3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more 
likely to a Communist-controlled state.” Even though LBJ desperately wanted to 
concentrate on his domestic agenda, he committed to continuing Kennedy’s policy. 
Bill Moyers, one of Johnson’s top assistants, wrote that Vietnam made Johnson feel 
like a catfsh who had “just grabbed a big juicy worm with a right sharp hook in the 
middle of it.”230 
Johnson had been unhappy as vice president, and there were rumors that Ken-
nedy would drop him from the 1964 ticket. To establish his own legitimacy, to
maintain the public support Kennedy had earned, and to keep together the team
Kennedy had assembled since he held those men in high regard, LBJ worked to per-
suade Kennedy’s advisers to remain in his administration. These aides, including
McNamara, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, George Ball, Walt Rostow, and Maxwell
Taylor, were the same men who had been advising Kennedy to increase the Ameri-
can commitment to South Vietnam, and they had a vested interest in the success
of that policy. Of these advisers, McNamara, who came to be known as the “archi-
tect” of Vietnam policy, likely exercised the most infuence on LBJ. Johnson lacked
knowledge and had little confdence on foreign policy matters; while he may have
dragged his feet in acting on the advice he received, LBJ ultimately followed the
recommendations of the men selected by Kennedy. With the exception of Ball,
each of these advisers had endorsed Kennedy’s policy of escalation.231 In sum, LBJ’s
allegiances would continue JFK’s policies. In a private conversation with Senate
majority leader Mansfeld’s top aide months before his reelection bid, President
Johnson may have let the real reason for Americanizing the war slip when he said,
“we do not want another China in Viet Nam.”232 Like his predecessor, Johnson
subscribed to the domino theory and believed that the loss of Vietnam would likely
threaten “the whole of Southeast Asia.” As a result, it was incumbent upon the
United States to “do everything that we can” to “stay there and help them, and that
is what we are going to do.”233 
As Johnson focused on his November 1964 bid for reelection, his military strat-
egy was a gradual one, to increase troop levels and escalate just enough to avoid 
losing. His problems in Vietnam were political as well as military. The purge of 
Diem, which Vice President Johnson had opposed, did not produce the promised 
results; indeed, it might have made things worse. General Duong Van Minh and his 
French-trained junta replaced Diem and were a disappointment to LBJ’s team. Like 
Diem, Minh proved to be too independent; he sought possible negotiation with 
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the National Liberation Front and considered a neutralization proposal put forth 
by French president Charles de Gaulle. Neutralization was anathema to LBJ and his 
advisers; they had already rejected that suggestion from Mike Mansf eld. 
Mansfeld started sending cautionary memos about Vietnam to the president 
before LBJ would have settled comfortably into his new living quarters in the White 
House. On December 7, 1963, the majority leader sent a memo based on a conversa-
tion the two men had, including copies of the memos Mansfeld had sent to Ken-
nedy, his Michigan State University speech, and his Senate report based on his trip 
to Indochina. After Johnson talked to Mansfeld’s aide Frank Valeo over Christmas, 
Mansfeld sent another memo on January 6, 1964. Mansfeld’s argument was for 
neutralization. Johnson brought out his big guns to refute it: Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and National Security Advisor Mc-
George Bundy. Thirty years later, McNamara admitted that he and Johnson’s other 
principal advisers—Rusk and Bundy—were “limited and shallow” in their “analysis 
and discussions” about neutralization.234 
The majority 1eader met with LBJ on February 10. A memo from Bundy sug-
gested the president “urge Mansfeld himself not to express his own doubts in public, 
at least for a while.” If LBJ listened to Bundy’s suggestion, Mansf eld f outed the 
advice, delivering a Senate speech on February 19 that, among other things, called 
for considering French president Charles de Gaulle’s neutralization proposal. Un-
offcially, Gibbons said the administration reaction ran from “shock to dismay to 
anger.” One offcial said, “Of course it wasn’t the Senator’s intention to give aid and 
comfort to the communists and undermine Vietnamese and American morale, but 
that’s exactly what he did. And he couldn’t have done a better job if his speech had 
been written in Hanoi.”235 Here was perhaps the last opportunity for Johnson to 
avoid a wider war and concentrate on his war on poverty, the so-called Great Society 
program, but LBJ feared that neutralization of South Vietnam would lead to the 
return of the “loss of China” charges and cost him the 1964 presidential election. 
To avoid the threat of neutralization, the United States cooperated with General 
Nguyen Khanh in a bloodless coup to replace Minh. Afterward, Johnson sent Khanh 
a message via McNamara, “No more of this coup shit.” But what Moss called “coup 
season” was on; there would be fve more in the next year, and seven governments 
ruled South Vietnam in 1964 alone. Ball wrote in his memoir that “obscure” military 
leaders would come to power with the “life span of June bugs.” Without a stable gov-
ernment to support, it proved diffcult for the United States to wage a war against the 
Communist insurgents. With each successive government looking over its shoulder 
because of the threat of yet another coup, it was diffcult for the  Army of the Republic 
of Vietnam (ARVN) to wage an effective war against the Vietcong.236 
Militarily, the United States and its South Vietnamese ally were losing the war. 
Moss explained LBJ’s policy in early 1964 as one “of doing the same that Kennedy 
had done, only doing more of it” in an effort to fend off the Communist rebellion. To 
avoid the humiliation of losing the war, Johnson reluctantly escalated by increasing 
the number of advisers in 1964 from 16,300 to 23,300 and raising the amount of aid 
to the South by $50 million. Yet in the short term, to protect his domestic program 
and his job, Johnson rejected proposals by the JCS for attacking the North through 
the ground and air. He also appointed General William Westmoreland to command 
US forces in Vietnam and General Taylor to be US Ambassador in Saigon in an effort 
to strengthen the American team in country. By mid-summer 1964, the administra-
tion plan was to get a congressional resolution to give LBJ authority to wage war 
and to use graduated air strikes against North Vietnam, at least after Johnson was 
successfully reelected.237 Walt Rostow suggested such a congressional resolution in 
February 1964, and by late May, William Bundy had completed a draft. His brother, THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
McGeorge, suggested to the president on June 12 that the resolution be presented TO VIETNAM 
in a way that would prevent “extended and divisive debate.” After receiving that 
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memo, LBJ decided on June 15 to postpone the effort; with the election coming up, 
a congressional resolution seemed an unnecessary risk.238 
Events in August brought the resolution off the table and stepped up the timeline 
for air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. While on a DE SOTO patrol, the USS 
Maddox was attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on August 2. The Maddox
was unscathed in the attack, not so the North Vietnamese vessels. The DE SOTO
program involved US destroyers patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin near the coast of North 
Vietnam, both as a “show of strength” and to gather intelligence. The Maddox attack 
took place shortly after a 34-A raid by South Vietnamese gunboats against North Viet-
namese military installations on two small islands near the Maddox, so to the North 
Vietnamese, the Maddox appeared to be part of the same operation. The Maddox had 
violated the twelve-mile coastal limit claimed by North Vietnam (the United States 
recognized only a three-mile limit); Gibbons calls it “clear” that South Vietnam and 
the United States were “provoking North Vietnam.” Two days later, the C. Turner Joy
was sent to support the Maddox, and both reported attacks by North Vietnamese tor-
pedo boats. It is likely that the second attack never happened, but was based on poor 
weather, bad sonar and radar readings, and jumpy sailors on the American ships, but 
the administration did not share its doubts with Congress or the public. After the 
reported second attack, Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnamese patrol 
boat bases and a supporting oil storage facility.239 President Johnson talked to the 
American people, emphasizing the moderation in his response: “Our response, for 
the present, will be limited and f tting. We Americans know, although others appear 
to forget, the risks of spreading confict. We still seek no wider war.”240 
Johnson’s retaliation worked domestically—a public opinion poll released Au-
gust 10 showed 85 percent of Americans supported the air strikes; LBJ’s approval 
rating soared from 42 to 72 percent. The North Vietnamese attack in the Tonkin Gulf 
gave the administration a way to avoid the “extended and divisive debate” McGeorge 
Bundy had warned against in June. On August 4, Johnson met with sixteen congres-
sional leaders to get what came to be known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed 
quickly; only Mansfeld and George Aiken (R-VT) expressed any misgivings in the 
private meeting, but both supported the resolution in public. With a minimum of 
debate, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution hastily passed in the House 416–0 and the 
Senate 88–2; Wayne Morse (D-OR) and Ernest Gruening (D-AK) voted against it.241 
In an impassioned and well-reasoned Senate speech on August 5, the Orego-
nian repeated the arguments against the war he had been making for some months, 
beginning: “I rise to speak in opposition to the joint resolution. I do so with a very 
sad heart. But I consider the resolution, as I considered . . . the Formosa resolution, 
and the . . . Middle East resolution to be naught but a resolution which embodies 
a predated declaration of war.” “For 10 years” the United States had “been a pro-
vocateur, every bit as much as North Vietnam” had been. “For 10 years” the United 
States had “violated the Geneva Agreement of 1954,” and “for 10 years” America 
had “sought to impose a military solution upon a political and economic problem.” 
In the Gulf of Tonkin, “the clear implication” was that the Maddox was “standing 
guard” while South Vietnamese gunboats attacked North Vietnamese installations. 
Morse talked of the “pious phrases of the resolution about defending freedom in 
South Vietnam,” declaring, “There is no freedom in South Vietnam.” Senator Morse 
decried the willingness of Congress to abdicate its constitutional responsibility to 
declare war. At the beginning of his speech, Morse had announced that he would not 
entertain questions during his speech, but would welcome them at the close. None 
were asked. The Senate was not willing to debate the vital issues raised by Morse.242 
Ball concluded that “Congress had abdicated” in passing the resolution. Ful-
bright, as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, effciently shepherded the bill 
through the Senate, but soon regretted that decision. At the time, Fulbright trusted his 
old friend Johnson not to extend the war unnecessarily and feared a Barry Goldwater 
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win in the presidential election. Johnson aide George Reedy suggested a number of 
senators were 
misled by Fulbright’s assurances and Fulbright had every reason to believe those 
assurances. I was in the room that night they had that meeting in which Fulbright 
got the big briefng. There is no doubt in my mind at all, I don’t know if Johnson 
actually used the words but there is no question that he was saying that this was 
a one-shot thing and it was only intended for this particular operation.243 
George McGovern was one of the senators receiving Fulbright’s assurances, and he 
considered his vote for the resolution the most regrettable of his career, writing in his 
memoir: “I commiserated with Bill Fulbright; he was just telling [Gaylord] Nelson 
(D-WI) and me what Johnson had told him.” The Johnson administration came 
to interpret the resolution as Morse predicted, as “the functional equivalent of a 
declaration of war.”244 
Even after a raid at an air base at Bien Hoa right before the election killed f ve
Americans and damaged and destroyed a number of US aircraft, Johnson rejected 
military advice to retaliate with air strikes; he had no reason to escalate and risk 
his expected electoral victory. Goldwater had been the hawk during the campaign, 
favoring escalation in Vietnam; Johnson’s adept political handling of the Tonkin 
Gulf crisis took away Goldwater’s major campaign issue and sealed the Arizonan’s 
defeat. Johnson’s more cautious rhetoric, like his most frequently quoted statement 
in Ohio—“We are not about to send American boys 9 or 10,000 miles away from 
home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves”—helped him to win 
election, but came back to haunt him when he didn’t live up to the promise.245 LBJ 
won in a historic landslide, giving him a mandate to pursue his domestic program 
and the war in Vietnam. Misleading Congress and the public over the incident in 
the Gulf of Tonkin, though, contributed to LBJ’s infamous “credibility gap.” After 
the American retaliatory bombing, North Vietnam escalated by sending, for the f rst 
time, units of its regular army to join the war in the South.246 
By late 1964 or early 1965, LBJ committed to a gradual escalation, f rst through 
a sustained bombing campaign in the North and then by sending US ground troops 
to the South. Before the election, Johnson had already authorized the planning, and 
by the end of November, his top advisers had agreed on the need to bomb. In early 
October, James Reston reported in the New York Times that Johnson’s advisers were 
talking about “how easy it would be to ‘provoke an incident’ in the Gulf of Tonkin 
that would justify an attack on North Vietnam.” As usual, Ball strenuously disagreed 
with these decisions. In a sixty-seven-page memorandum he warned that “once 
on the tiger’s back, we cannot be sure of picking the place to dismount.” But Ball 
could not engage Johnson’s team in “point-by-point” argument and believed he was 
treated with “benign tolerance” and as “almost subversive” by Johnson’s advisers as 
they went about planning to win a war Ball didn’t think could be won. On Christmas 
Eve, the Vietcong bombed offcers’ quarters in the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, killing two 
Americans. Johnson once again resisted advice for a retaliatory bombing, partially 
because of the instability of the government in Saigon. But as 1964 came to an end, 
’”247Gibbons writes, the war “was on the verge of being ‘Americanized.
LBJ Escalates and the Antiwar Movement Rallies, 
January–June 1965 
THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
The Vietcong provided the excuse the administration had been waiting for on Febru- TO VIETNAM 
ary 7, 1965, with an attack at Pleiku killing eight American troops, followed by an 
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assault on Qui Nhon three days later. Retaliatory raids on North Vietnam began on 
February 7 and became sustained on February 13 after a series of meetings LBJ held 
with administration offcials and members of Congress. The bombing campaign of-
fcially became known as Operation Rolling Thunder on March 2. After Vietcong 
forces battered two ARVN units and with North Vietnamese regular forces entering 
the South, Taylor and McGeorge Bundy had sent warnings of “disastrous defeat” 
without US bombing; Johnson reluctantly agreed, saying, “Stable government or no 
stable government we’ll do what we have to do.”248 
Everyone was in agreement on the need for retaliatory bombing at a meeting 
on February 6, including Ball, with the exception of Senator Mansfeld, who looked 
directly at Johnson and said that the “attack has opened many eyes. We are not 
now in a penny ante game. It appears that the local population in South Vietnam 
is not behind us, [or] else the Viet Cong could not have carried out their surprise 
attack.” William Bundy remembered: “This was the only time I ever saw a member 
of Congress who said, ‘Mr. President, I think you are wrong on basic policy’ in any 
direct session.” Johnson recalled responding to his majority leader: “We have kept 
our gun over the mantel and our shells in the cupboard for a long time now. And 
what was the result? They are killing our men while they sleep in the night. I can’t ask 
our American soldiers out there to continue to fght with one hand tied behind their 
backs.” Perhaps intimidated by Johnson’s response, at the other meetings Mansf eld 
attended, the majority leader expressed his dissent via memos. When Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey expressed reservations with the bombing at a February 10 meet-
ing, LBJ banned him from Vietnam decision-making for a number of months.249 
Johnson’s escalation was disturbing to Senator Frank Church (D-ID), who took 
to the Senate foor on February 17 to talk about it. Robert Mann considers this “bold” 
speech from one of the Senate’s fnest orators important enough to lead with it in 
the prologue to his book on the role of Congress during the Vietnam War. Mann 
claims the speech marked the “cautious beginnings” of the “nine year congressional 
debate” over Indochina. 
Of course, Morse and Gruening had spoken out earlier than Senator Church; they 
cast the only two congressional votes opposing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But 
Morse and Gruening were deviants and easy to discount; Church was not. Church bi-
ographers LeRoy Ashby and Rod Gramer suggest that Morse lacked infuence with his 
colleagues because of his “gadf y’s reputation,” and “Gruening’s tendency to blame 
the U.S. as the aggressor struck most listeners as harsh and strident.” Frank Valeo, 
Mansfeld’s aide and secretary to the Senate, called Morse “an extraordinary man” 
who “couldn’t get along with anyone for any length of time.” Mann labeled Morse 
and Gruening “mavericks, well known for their willingness to champion unpopular 
causes,” but Mann also indicated that “the two men had caused barely a ripple on 
Washington’s political waters.”250 Indeed, Morse’s “fery” spring 1964 speeches on 
Vietnam flled more than two hundred pages in the Congressional Record, and he 
barnstormed the country repeating his “hellfre-and-brimstone” warnings to the na-
tion. Senator McGovern believed that “personalizing” their attacks made Gruening 
and Morse less effective in their dissent. Church’s aide Bryce Nelson, in speaking of 
an earlier Church speech, felt that “younger and more cautious senators” didn’t want 
to be linked to Morse and Gruening because of their stridency, but they were willing 
to consider Church’s arguments.251 
Church had been troubled for some time by the drift toward war in Vietnam 
and had made remarks on the Senate foor on June 23, 1964, that Mann considered 
“signifcant” and Bryce Nelson labeled “important.” His biographers claim that these 
remarks were extemporaneous—that Church had planned to commemorate the 
twentieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, but became engaged 
in a debate with Fulbright over the desirability of utilizing the UN for a settlement 
in Vietnam. Church’s dissent in 1964 was relatively minor and did not break with 
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President Johnson in any signifcant way. But one publication interpreted his com-
ments as marking “the day Frank Church became a dove.”252 
By early 1965, Church was ready to risk breaking with his president, but he 
told a friend: “I’m reluctant to repudiate the President on Vietnam,” fearing that his 
action would remove “any chance that may be left to me to exert some moderat-
ing infuence upon the future course of events.” After journalist Walter Lippmann 
called a Church-authored New York Times Magazine article “splendid,” and against 
the wishes of the senator’s wife, Church committed to using that article as the basis 
for a Senate speech three days later. 
In his February 17 address to the Senate, Church pointed out that there was no 
stable government for the United States to support: “The weakness in South Viet 
Nam emanates from Saigon itself, where we, as foreigners, are powerless to unite the 
spoiling factions. A family feud is never settled by outsiders. Only the Vietnamese 
themselves can furnish the solution.” The senator pushed hard for negotiation, say-
ing: “A spreading war on the Asian mainland, pitting American troops against Asian 
troops, is a war we cannot fnish. In the end, after a tragic trail of casualties out of all 
proportion to our real national interest, we will have to negotiate a settlement with 
the Communists, even as such a truce was fnally negotiated in Korea.” But the part 
of the speech that most angered the administration was his call for neutralization: 
It would be to our national advantage then, to seek an international agree-
ment for the neutralization of the whole great region that used to be French 
Indo-China. The transitional phase of such a settlement might be policed by 
the United Nations, or by a special high commission set up to preside over a 
cease-fre in South Viet Nam, to supervise the withdrawal of all foreign troops, 
and to maintain order, while an independent and unaligned new government is 
formed by the Vietnamese themselves. 
As indicated previously, Church’s call for neutralization was not a new idea— 
French president Charles de Gaulle, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, 
Lippmann, and Senator Mansfeld all had pushed for it earlier—but it remained 
antithetical to Johnson and his advisers. McGovern, who had spoken out against 
American involvement in Vietnam in September 1963 but had been largely mute 
on the issue since, followed Church’s speech by endorsing his call for negotiations, 
giving the administration two new public Senate critics over its Vietnam policy. Both 
of these young Senate Turks proved formidable; Mann claims McGovern became 
“the war’s most visible and vociferous opponent.”253 
Unlike Church’s 1964 speech, the February 17 address had an impact and 
caused a rift with the Johnson administration. The following day, Johnson sent 
his national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, to meet with McGovern, Church, 
and several other emerging Senate critics in an effort to stife public debate, but 
Church refused to be silenced. When the senators returned to the Senate f oor, they 
were under attack from Republican and Democratic colleagues who supported an 
expanded war. That evening, Church and his wife were part of a group of several 
dozen senators and their spouses who met with President and Mrs. Johnson for a 
briefng on Vietnam. Johnson cornered Church in what the senator called a “nostril 
to nostril” conversation, trying “to show me my error.” Within days, Mann writes, 
“The civilized discourse that Church initiated would dissolve into a far wider and 
more belligerent debate over Vietnam policy.”254 
Clark Clifford maintained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and McNamara knew 
that once Rolling Thunder began, American troops would be required to protect 
aircraft on the ground and that later their role would inevitably become offensive. THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
No one told the president this because they wanted him to agree to Rolling Thunder. TO VIETNAM 
General Westmoreland requested marines protect the air base at Da Nang in late 
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February, and even though General Taylor opposed it, arguing that once American 
troops were on the ground it would be “very diffcult to hold the line,” the adminis-
tration disregarded Taylor’s warnings, and thirty-fve hundred marines waded ashore 
on March 8. This was one of the most crucial decisions in the American war, yet it 
was largely ignored in the United States. Westmoreland realized by mid-March that 
further US forces would be needed, and many administration offcials agreed but 
feared domestic opposition like that expressed by Church. Rolling Thunder did not 
achieve its objective of forcing the North to negotiate on US terms; instead, North 
Vietnam escalated on the ground, further weakening the position of the South.255 
Rolling Thunder had brought the war to television’s evening news and the front 
page of the daily newspapers, causing LBJ to fear that congressional conservatives 
would use the war as an excuse to block his Great Society program. Johnson’s advisers 
were taken by surprise when it also led to an actual antiwar movement with dissent 
spreading across the nation’s campuses. The frst teach-in occurred at the University 
of Michigan on March 24, 1965, and the idea quickly caught on; on May 15, 122 
campuses debated the war through teach-ins. In an attempt to combat domestic 
opposition, McGeorge Bundy wrote a speech for LBJ to justify the bombing based 
on the aggression emulating from North Vietnam. Johnson rejected it as a speech 
because it would seem like a formal announcement of a policy change, something 
the president was not willing to concede; instead, at the beginning of March, it was 
released as a white paper. Chester Cooper, a Bundy aide, was the major author of the 
fnal draft and believed that the argument the white paper made was “pretty frail” 
and a “dismal failure.” Part of the problem was much of the evidence that might 
have been used was classifed, but the amount of Vietcong aid the white paper could 
document coming from North Vietnam and the Communist world was miniscule in 
comparison to the total the United States was pouring into the South.256 
In addition to the domestic reaction, there was an international outcry over Roll-
ing Thunder. Ball wrote in his memoir that what LBJ wanted from foreign leaders 
was “unquestioning support,” especially for the policy about which he was most 
“uncertain,” Vietnam. British foreign secretary Michael Stewart did not provide that 
support when he met with Rusk and Johnson before delivering a scathing speech 
at the National Press Club, concluding: “What I am in fact asking the United States 
to display is what your Declaration of Independence called ‘a decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind.’” Johnson did not enjoy hearing Jefferson’s words used against 
him by a Brit. United Nations secretary general U Thant had been trying to obtain 
private talks between the United States and North Vietnam but after being ignored 
by Washington and the initiation of Rolling Thunder, U Thant became a critic of the 
Johnson administration policy.257 
On March 25, Johnson made an announcement that sounded like he was mov-
ing toward negotiation with North Vietnam; Cooper later called it “merely rhetoric, 
a public relations holding-action.”258 Regardless of Johnson’s intent or the veracity of 
his peace overtures, the president remained emphatic: 
As I said last year and again last week, “it is and it will remain the policy of the 
United States to furnish assistance to support South Viet-Nam for as long as 
is required to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control.” The 
military actions of the United States will be such, and only such, as serve that 
purpose—at the lowest possible cost in human life to our allies, to our own men, 
and to our adversaries, too.259 
The administration’s next public relations effort culminated in Johnson’s Johns 
Hopkins speech on April 7. With this major address, the administration sought to 
hold the nation’s support on bombing while preparing the public for the commit-
ment of ground troops. In the speech, LBJ justif ed the air war because of increased 
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attacks on the South, but asserted: “This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in 
what we believe that purpose requires.” 
Johnson faced an audience that numbered more than one thousand faculty and 
students and approximately six million television viewers. Many Johnson aides were 
involved in the shaping of the speech. The original outline came from National 
Security Advisor Bundy; it was then drafted by presidential assistants Richard Good-
win and Jack Valenti. The president adapted to his audience early in the speech: 
“Viet-Nam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there nor do 
we seek any. The war is dirty, dirty and brutal and diffcult. And some four hundred 
young men, born into an America that’s bursting with opportunity and promise, 
have ended their lives on Viet-Nam’s steaming soil.” 
Johnson announced that “we remain ready . . . for unconditional discussion” 
(not negotiations). The language choice of “discussions” rather than “negotiations” 
was suggested by Bundy and illustrates the reluctance of the administration to actu-
ally bargain, which would imply making some concessions. 
LBJ offered a carrot to Hanoi: “I will ask the Congress to join in a billion-dollar 
American investment in this effort as soon as it is underway. . . . The vast Mekong 
River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own TVA 
[Tennessee Valley Authority]. . . . We can do all these things on a scale that’s never 
dreamed of before.” The president confdently predicted to his press secretary, Bill 
Moyers, “Old Ho can’t turn me down.” But Johnson also threatened a stick: “We 
will not be defeated. We will not grow tired. We will not withdraw, either openly or 
under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.” 
The speech at Johns Hopkins University was the most vigorous and expansive 
defense of LBJ’s Vietnam policy and strategy thus far and likely was a last-ditch at-
tempt to avoid a larger war, but LBJ also used his bully pulpit to win over his opposi-
tion; he was especially bothered by growing opposition in the Senate, as represented 
by Frank Church’s February 17 address. Prior to delivery, Johnson invited his leading 
Senate critics—Church, Mansfeld, McGovern, and Fulbright—to the White House to 
read the speech and each was impressed, at least in the short term. So was Lippmann, 
the leading press opponent of an expanded war.260 
Although there was some criticism by Republican hawks and Senators Morse 
and Gruening, the speech was received favorably in the United States. The North 
Vietnamese, Soviets, and Chinese, however, denounced the speech the following 
day; North Vietnam listed four points needed for a settlement of the conf ict. These 
four points remained North Vietnam’s basis for a settlement throughout the war. 
The third point, which allowed the Communist NLF involvement in the South Viet-
namese government, was one the Johnson administration was unwilling to accept 
because it would have likely led to a Communist South Vietnam.261 
While LBJ temporarily co-opted Fulbright at their meeting with Senator Man-
sfeld prior to the Johns Hopkins speech, the chair of Foreign Relations came to 
believe the meeting was merely an attempt to get him and the majority leader “on 
board.” Fulbright quickly realized that nothing would come from the president’s 
proposal. Lippmann reached the same conclusion. McGovern came to believe Johns 
Hopkins “was primarily calculated to disarm the dissenters at home and abroad 
without changing policy.”262 
Opposition to Johnson’s Vietnam policy continued to grow among the public as 
well as in the Senate. On April 17, 1965, ten days after his address at Johns Hopkins, 
an estimated ffteen thousand to twenty-fve thousand Americans descended on 
Washington, DC, to mount an early anti–Vietnam War event sponsored by Students 
for a Democratic Society (SDS). The number far exceeded expectations, and at the 
time it was the largest antiwar protest in the history of the nation’s capital. After THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
marching near the White House for several hours, the group moved to the Washing- TO VIETNAM 
ton Monument for entertainment provided by Phil Ochs, Joan Baez, Judy Collins, 
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and others, plus additional speakers, including Senator Gruening and journalist I. F. 
Stone. SDS scheduled the fnal speech for its president, Paul Potter.263 
The SDS existed from 1960 to 1970, but its origins can be traced to the Intercol-
legiate Socialist Society circa 1905; the name SDS was chosen in 1960 to replace the 
most recent incarnation of this left-wing college group, the Student League for In-
dustrial Democracy. The SDS became the largest student organization of the 1960s; 
its membership peaked at more than one hundred thousand members with more 
than four hundred college chapters. Initially, the SDS was interested primarily in 
domestic issues, particularly racism and poverty; it was drawn to the confict in Viet-
nam somewhat reluctantly. Adapting an antiwar position led directly to the group’s 
increase in membership. The SDS’s demise came with splits between moderate and 
more radical elements that took the name of the Weathermen and came to favor a 
militant approach to ending the war. When the Weathermen won leadership of the 
SDS in 1969, they eventually shut down its national headquarters. The Weathermen 
were forced to go underground, and the SDS ceased to exist.264 
By all accounts, the speech by the twenty-two-year-old Paul Potter was the high-
light of the day. Fellow SDS member Todd Gitlin wrote of frst meeting Potter: “I 
was particularly taken by Potter, a sinew-lean Midwesterner with burning globes for 
eyes. . . . Potter exuded a sense of having earned the right to every eloquent syllable 
he spoke with his own hard-won thoughtfulness.” Casey Hayden of the SDS recalled 
that day: “The cherry trees were in bloom and everything was white. It was beautiful 
and I was lying on the ground when Paul spoke and I remember his speech and I 
remember realizing that this was a turning point.” Kirkpatrick Sale reported that 
after Potter’s speech, “The huge crowd sat still for a moment, then rose to its feet 
with the loudest and most sustained applause of the day.” James Miller claimed: 
“Potter’s speech managed to capture the moral passion and restless questioning that 
constituted the heart and soul of the early New Left.” Gitlin recalled: “Paul Potter’s 
talk was the galvanizing moment when a new Left position was launched—about 
the war, about honor, about decency, about the need to transform the country in 
some enormous way. It was ringing. It was the purest possible expression of the 
SDS mood.”265 Potter referred to the administration’s white paper as a “distorting or 
downright false document” and said, in part: 
Most of us grew up thinking that the United States was a strong but humble 
nation, that involved itself in world affairs only reluctantly, that respected the 
integrity of other nations and other systems, and that engaged in wars only as 
a last resort. This was a nation with no large standing army, with no design for 
external conquest. . . . 
But in recent years, the withdrawal from the hysteria of the Cold War and 
the development of a more aggressive, activist foreign policy have done much to 
force many of us to rethink attitudes that were deep and basic sentiments about 
our country. And now the incredible war in Vietnam has provided the razor, the 
terrifying sharp cutting edge that has fnally severed the last vestiges of our illu-
sion that morality and democracy are the guiding principles of American foreign 
policy. The saccharine self-righteous moralism that promises the Vietnamese a 
billion dollars while taking billions of dollars for economic and social destruc-
tion and political repression is rapidly losing what power it might ever have had 
to reassure us about the decency of our foreign policy. The further we explore the 
reality of what this country is doing and planning in Vietnam the more we are 
driven toward the conclusion of Senator Morse that the United States is rapidly 
becoming the greatest threat to world peace in the world today. This, this is a 
terrible and bitter insight for people who grew up as we did—and our revulsion 
at that insight, our refusal to accept it as inevitable or necessary, is one of the 
reasons that so many people have come today.266 
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At the end of Potter’s address, the group marched to the Capitol, where the 
leaders were to present Congress with a petition to end the war. With the excitement 
of the speeches and music, the crowd grew unruly, and Sale writes that the chant 
of “Let’s all go, LET’S ALL GO” went up. At this early stage of the antiwar movement, 
though, the SDS was not yet confrontational, the leaders were able to control the 
crowd, and the petition was delivered as planned. Two examples of the gentleness of 
the early antiwar movement can be heard on the tapes made of the event. The f rst 
is a woman making announcements prior to Potter’s speech. She asked the crowd to 
“please pick up all debris at the end of this program.” Right after Potter’s speech, be-
fore singing, Joan Baez reminded the audience that the protest was “nonviolent.”267 
LBJ was at his ranch in Texas during Potter’s speech in Washington, so the SDS 
held a simultaneous demonstration there so that the president would “feel an anti-
war presence.” About forty SDS members marched silently outside the ranch gates, 
carrying signs, watched carefully by Secret Service and Texas law enforcement off cers.
McGeorge Bundy was concerned enough about the April 17 protests to write LBJ: 
“We shall have a left-wing student protest rally here in Washington with pickets also 
at the Ranch.” Bundy recommended “a strong peaceloving statement . . . [to] help 
cool them off ahead of time” and Johnson obliged, reading a statement to the press 
on the front lawn of the ranch during the protest in which he complained that his 
Johns Hopkins proposal for peace had been “met with tired names and slogans and 
a refusal to talk” by Hanoi. LBJ expressed understanding for those opposed to the 
bombing, but claimed that the United States had no choice, saying America would 
remain in South Vietnam “as long as is necessary, with the might that is required, 
whatever the risk and whatever the cost. . . . there is no human power capable of forc-
ing us from Viet-Nam.” In her memoir, Lady Bird Johnson wrote that her husband’s 
statement was “planned as a countermove, a chess play,” to a call from Fulbright sev-
eral days earlier for a bombing halt. After the march, Bundy wrote that opponents of 
the war had a negative impact on foreign policy, mentioning Lippmann, Fulbright, 
and “marching students.” Bundy asked FBI director J Edgar Hoover if Communists 
had played a role in this demonstration, and Hoover mistakenly told LBJ that the 
SDS was “largely inf ltrated by communists”; shortly thereafter, the FBI began wire-
tapping the SDS.268 
The march received limited media attention, but it positioned the SDS as the 
major antiwar group on college campuses. Gitlin claimed they were “f ooded with 
recruits” and uncertain how to handle the numbers. Knowing that Potter’s speech 
was important, the SDS had it printed and widely distributed. While some versions 
of the address give it the title “We Must Name the System,” there is no indication 
that Potter intended for that to be the case. But that phrase is the most remembered 
from the speech. Potter himself found the term “capitalism” inadequate and claimed 
that he was intentionally ambiguous by not naming the system. Miller reports that 
the “inner circle” of the SDS worked on this address and decided not to give a name 
to the system. Later in 1965, the new president of the SDS, Carl Oglesby, delivered 
another signifcant address at a different march on Washington and took Potter up 
on his call, labeling the system “corporate liberalism.”269 
The emergence of the SDS and growing antiwar sentiment on campuses and in 
the general society put a constraint on LBJ and later on President Richard Nixon. 
Even with the demise of the SDS in 1970, the potential for campuses to erupt in 
antiwar fervor remained a threat to an executive branch waging an unpopular war. 
In early April 1965, Johnson had given permission for relatively small increases 
in the number of American troops being sent to Vietnam; Taylor remained the only 
military adviser opposed to these increases, fearing that it might “sap” the “initiative” 
of the government of South Vietnam. Johnson’s military advisers met in Honolulu THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
on April 20 and decided that since bombing alone wasn’t gaining the hoped-for re- TO VIETNAM 
sults, more ground troops were necessary; they recommended raising the level from 
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the current thirty-three thousand to eighty-two thousand. Ball was strongly opposed 
but received no support from LBJ’s principal advisers.270 
The president was unhappy with the lack of vocal support he was receiving 
from Congress, and on May 2 at a meeting with congressional leaders, LBJ forced 
their hand by asking for a $700 million appropriation to meet military expenses in 
Vietnam. There was no immediate requirement for the money. Mann reports that 
the Department of Defense had $2 billion that could have been shifted to meet 
current needs, but Johnson was tired of the “second guessing of Fulbright, Mansf eld, 
Church, Gaylord Nelson, and McGovern”; he wanted to force a vote in support of his 
Vietnam policy. Publicly, the president put it this way: “This is in no way a routine 
appropriation. . . . Each Member of Congress who supports this request is voting 
to continue our effort to try to halt Communist aggression. Each is saying that the 
Congress and the President stand before the world in joint determination that the 
independence of South Viet-Nam shall be preserved and that Communist conquest 
shall not succeed.”271 
William Bundy later called Johnson’s move a “gimmick.” Morse saw through 
LBJ’s strategy, arguing that Johnson “wants to commit those senators again,” as he 
had with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This led to a strident attack on Morse by Mi-
nority Leader Everett Dirksen. From this point forward, Mann concludes, Johnson’s 
aides and his supporters in Congress viewed congressional critics as “enemies, whose 
motives and patriotism would be questioned.” On this vote, Gaylord Nelson joined 
Gruening and Morse in opposition, but with minimal debate in either House, the 
appropriation passed 88–3 in the Senate and 408–7 in the House. Johnson was able 
to say publicly, “I am very proud to be signing this resolution only 3 days after it was 
sent to the Congress.” From this time until 1973, when the United States left the war, 
members of Congress who opposed the confict still voted for appropriations, fear-
ing that not doing so would be viewed as failure to support American forces in the 
feld. As Morse predicted, Johnson later used this vote along with the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution to refute critics who claimed he waged the war without congressional 
consent.272 
Under international and domestic pressure, the administration tried a bombing 
pause on May 12, 1965. U Thant and Indian president Sarvepalli Radhakrishnam 
both publicly urged such a cessation in the bombing; Robert Kennedy, recently 
elected senator (D-NY), visited LBJ to argue for a pause, the New York Times editorial-
ized for one, and a number of senators, including Church, Mansfeld, and Fulbright 
supported it. Some supporters of escalation also wanted a cessation in the bombing, 
expecting no reaction to such a move by North Vietnam, thus showing the North’s 
recalcitrance. When the North did not respond, the bombing resumed on May 18. 
Johnson said: “We have stopped in deference to Mansfeld and Fulbright, but we 
don’t want to do it too long else we lose our base of support. . . . We tried out their 
notions and got no results.” McNamara later admitted that the pause was a “propa-
ganda effort.”273 
Another bloodless coup occurred in early June, bringing the f fth government 
to Saigon within a year. Air Marshall Nguyen Cao Ky and General Nguyen Van 
Thieu deposed the civilian Phan Huy Quat. Quat had opposed the introduction of 
large numbers of American combat troops, and many in the administration were 
not sorry to see him go; Ky and Thieu were unabashedly pro-American. The fall 
of Quat led Ball to argue with Secretary of State Rusk: “You’ve got no government. 
It’s impossible to win in a situation where you’ve got this totally fragile political 
base. These people are clowns.” Rusk was not persuaded. Mansfeld decried the 
loss of civilian rule under Quat. Both JFK and LBJ had traced the US obligation to 
South Vietnam to Eisenhower’s 1954 letter of support to Diem, but Ike’s support 
was predicated upon Diem using that aid effectively and his government passing 
needed reform. The coup against Quat gave Johnson a way out if he had wanted 
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one, but the president wasn’t seeking an out that would make the United States 
look like a loser in the war.274 
America’s position was bleak entering the crucial months of June and July 1965. 
While no one knew it at the time, Thieu and Ky fnally brought stability to the gov-
ernment of South Vietnam, ruling in tandem for the rest of the war. But they were 
military leaders with no mandate from the public. As Mansfeld put it: “There is not a 
government to speak of in Saigon. In short, we are now at the point where we are no 
longer dealing with anyone who represents anybody in a political sense.” U. Alexis 
Johnson, by then the deputy director of the US Embassy in Saigon, pointed out a 
problem with Ky when describing him as an “unguided missile,” one who was erratic 
and who drank, womanized, and gambled. ARVN had high levels of desertion, draft 
avoidance was a major problem, and the South was losing the war to its Communist 
opponents. American bombing had accomplished little to reverse that trend.275 
LBJ Takes America to War, June and July 1965 
On June 7, McNamara received a “bombshell” from General Westmoreland, the most 
disturbing memorandum he received during his seven years as head of the Pentagon. 
More North Vietnamese regular forces were expected to arrive, and even though the 
Vietcong had yet to employ “their full capabilities,” Westmoreland reported, the 
ARVN forces were not able to cope with their enemy. The military situation was grim; 
South Vietnam could not survive without outside forces. Westmoreland, McNamara 
concluded, was asking for a “dramatic and open-ended expansion of American mili-
tary involvement.” The secretary of defense wrote, “The issue would hang over all 
of us like a menacing cloud for the next seven weeks.” Even Taylor was won over, 
writing: “The strength of the enemy offensive had completely overcome my former 
reluctance to use American ground troops in general combat.”276 
While Johnson and his aides used that seven weeks to determine whether to 
meet Westmoreland’s demands, Ball, from inside the administration, Mansf eld 
from outside, and a few others made a last-ditch effort to persuade the president 
to avoid the expected commitment of large-scale American forces. Kahin writes, 
“McGeorge Bundy, from his position of proximity in the White House, appears to 
have interacted most frequently with the president and spent considerable time in 
undercutting the arguments of Ball and Mansfeld.” John Burke and Fred Greenstein 
conclude that “Bundy consistently brought differences of viewpoint to Johnson’s 
attention . . . [but] in advancing his own views he sometimes failed to do justice to 
the views of others”; Johnson aide Harry McPherson agreed that Bundy would “push 
. . . [his policy] subtly.”277 
Mansfeld sent memos to LBJ on June 5 and 9, criticizing the advice the president 
was receiving from his inner circle. The majority leader predicted disaster if the Joint 
Chiefs got their way in bombing Hanoi and Haiphong: the world community would 
turn against the United States, China would become dominant in North Vietnam, 
and this would lead to “acceleration of the ground war in South Viet Nam.” Then 
McNamara’s prediction of a need for three hundred thousand men would become 
fve hundred thousand if General “Giap’s army does not move in full and open force 
across the 17th parallel,” or even millions if they did. To preclude such a disastrous 
scenario, Mansfeld called for “an immediate cease-fre and stand-fast” throughout 
Vietnam to get to the bargaining table. Mansfeld favored using US air and naval 
power while committing one hundred thousand troops to hold Saigon and coastal 
enclaves until a settlement could be reached.278 Johnson read Mansfeld’s June 9 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
memo at a meeting with his advisers the next day, and McGeorge Bundy’s notes TO VIETNAM 
indicate that those present refuted it “line by line.”279 
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On June 15, Senator Fulbright entered the fray. Unlike Senator Church, Ful-
bright was a contemporary of President Johnson and a close associate. LBJ respected 
Fulbright’s views on international issues; while serving as Senate majority leader, 
Johnson referred to Fulbright as “my Secretary of State.” LBJ helped Fulbright be-
come chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and he unsuccessfully 
intervened with President-elect John F. Kennedy to select Fulbright as his secretary 
of state. Fulbright was in basic agreement on the Johnson administration’s Vietnam 
policy through most of 1964. In his “Old Myths and New Realities” speech on March 
25 of that year, the senator was the f rst off cial to challenge a number of Cold War 
foreign-policy assumptions, yet he accepted Johnson’s position on Vietnam. Ful-
bright’s biographer suggests that Johnson asked Fulbright to support the administra-
tion’s Vietnam policy in this speech, probably to def ect a recent speech by Senator 
Gruening calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam.280 
Before the 1964 presidential election, Fulbright began warning LBJ in private 
against further involvement in Vietnam, but he avoided public criticism out of fear 
that he would lose his ability to infuence US policy. As late as February 1965, Ful-
bright admitted to feeling insecure about the issue, as he was “in the process of 
learning about Vietnam.” Carl Marcy, Fulbright’s chief of staff on the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, said that once Fulbright started studying Vietnam, he “im-
mersed himself in that area in a way that surprised me.” Marcy added: 
Fulbright probably knew more about the history and the background character-
istics of Indochina than Rusk, or certainly than . . . McNamara or Johnson. The 
policy makers were so busy making policy that they had no time to read or to 
think. Fulbright took time to read and think, but he was not able at that time to 
determine policy.281 
Yet, like Senator Church, Fulbright was reluctant to publicly break with Johnson over 
the war, writing: 
I kept thinking that I could infuence [Johnson] privately. I saw him quite often. 
He was very friendly to me, and as long as I didn’t make a public statement, he 
was willing to talk. Not only was he willing to talk, but he had Dean Rusk talk 
to me and he sent other people to talk to me. I kept thinking, as long as people 
were doing that, that one of these days I might inf uence them.282 
In late April 1965, in an executive session of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, Fulbright expressed frustration with Rusk over Johnson’s lack of consultation 
with Congress: “It would seem to me not out of order if we are going to send thirty 
thousand, ffty thousand, one hundred thousand men, that the Congress might have 
the say about it.” Yet Mann claims that Fulbright’s “political loyalty” and “friend-
ship” with LBJ prevented his expressing these mounting misgivings in public.283 
On June 14, in what Mann called a “tempestuous” meeting, LBJ asked Fulbright 
to again stand up for Johnson’s Vietnam policy, and the senator delivered a speech 
the following day, which was followed with an appearance on NBC’s Today Show on 
June 16. By this time, Fulbright could no longer in good conscience defend adminis-
tration policy as he had in 1964. The address seems quite moderate; as he told LBJ he 
would, Fulbright praised the president for resisting pressure to widen the war, saying: 
“President Johnson has resisted these pressures with steadfastness and statesmanship 
and remains committed to the goal of ending the war at the earliest possible time 
by negotiations without preconditions. In so doing, he is providing the leadership 
appropriate to a great nation.” The Arkansan was against withdrawal, but he also op-
posed escalation, and wanted “to end the war at the earliest possible time by a negoti-
ated settlement involving major concessions by both sides.” In Fulbright’s Today Show
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appearance, he was asked to elaborate on what he meant by “major concessions,” and 
with his answer, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became one of 
the frst government leaders to advocate negotiating directly with the NLF. 
Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, Senate minority leader Dirksen, and other 
Republicans attacked Fulbright’s position. In Johnson’s mind, as he was moving 
toward the commitment of US troops in the confict, this speech made Fulbright a 
public critic of his policy. Pat Holt of the Foreign Relations Committee staff said that 
after this speech, “Johnson sort of scratched Fulbright off his list.” Marcy “thought it 
more important for [Fulbright] to keep a close relationship with Lyndon than to do 
anything that would break that relationship. I felt Fulbright still had access to and 
infuence with the president, something one does not throw away lightly.” Fulbright 
admitted that his treatment by the president made him a stronger critic of the war, 
and in 1966, the senator began to use the Foreign Relations Committee to educate 
citizens through public hearings on Vietnam. Newsweek columnist Jonathan Alter 
claims these hearings “sharpen[ed] the debate,” and George F. Will concludes that 
because of NBC’s decision to televise them, Fulbright’s hearings “helped mobilize 
opposition to the war.”284 
About his break from LBJ, Fulbright wrote in 1966: “A Senator who wishes to in-
fuence foreign policy must consider the . . . results of communicating privately with 
the Executive or, alternatively, of speaking out publicly. I do not see any great prin-
ciple here: it is a matter of how one can better achieve what one hopes to achieve.285 
Mansfeld and Ball faced the same rhetorical choice as Church and Fulbright, but 
made a different choice and continued to keep their criticism of Vietnam policy 
private. Ball explained: “I f gured that I could do better by remaining on the inside. 
Had I quit, the story would have made the front page of the New York Times next 
day—and then I would have been promptly forgotten.” When asked about his rhe-
torical strategy of private criticism but public support for LBJ, Mansf eld responded 
simply, “Evidently it did not help.”286 In truth, none of these men, using different 
rhetorical strategies, were able to infuence Johnson before his decision to commit 
ground troops, leading to America’s only lost war. 
Mansfeld wrote another memo that he sent on June 22 that was rejected and 
again refuted by Bundy. Trying to minimize their sharp differences, the president 
wrote Mansfeld, “Bundy’s comment persuades me once again that we agree much 
more than we differ.” Bundy wrote LBJ at the end of June calling Mansf eld, Church, 
and Fulbright “reluctant realists” whose heart “says get out but whose heads tell them 
the present policy is unavoidable.” Bundy then expressed the actual goal of the 
administration that in the summer of 1965 made serious negotiation with North 
Vietnam impossible: “The problem is one of offering a plausible alternative that 
would assure the existence of a non-Communist South Vietnam.” Johnson told Ball 
in a telephone conversation, “Mansfeld is unhappy.”287 But so was Ball. 
On June 18 and July 1, Ball sent LBJ memoranda; as he often had, Johnson’s 
aide drew the analogy to the French involvement in Vietnam. In these memos, Ball 
warned that the proposed course would lead to “mounting US casualties, no assur-
ance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the 
road.” Ball recommended “a compromise settlement which achieves less than our 
stated objectives and thus cuts our losses while we still have the freedom of maneu-
ver to do so”; rather than a “loss of face,” Ball argued that our allies would view such 
a position as “American maturity.” In Vietnam-on-the-Potomac, Moya Ball concludes 
that George Ball “was one of the few who recognized that negotiation involves” what 
Ball called in his June 18 memo “concession on our side as well as the V.C.” Rusk, 
William Bundy, and McNamara memoranda arrived at the same time as Ball’s and 
“overwhelmed” what Mann calls Ball’s “lonely pleas for caution.”288 THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
Still, LBJ hesitated. On July 8–9, the president gathered the so-called Wise Men, TO VIETNAM 
sixteen presidential consultants on foreign affairs, including Dean Acheson, Omar 
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Bradley, Eugene Black, Arthur Dean, and John McCloy. The group was in general 
agreement that Johnson had to proceed to ground troops; that to negotiate then 
would be a sign of weakness. Historian Lloyd C. Gardner writes that Johnson was 
surprised at the “near unanimity and vigor of their enthusiasm for Vietnam as the 
place to hold the line against communism.” Roswell Gilpatric, a former assistant sec-
retary of defense and member of the Wise Men, summarized their position as calling 
“for the application of whatever amounts of military power may be needed, perhaps 
as much as brought to bear in Korea ffteen years ago.” Ball had an opportunity to 
present his opposition but later said he had “made no impression” on the group.289 
General Andrew Goodpaster and an ad hoc study group were sent to Vietnam 
for a military assessment in early July 1965 to answer the question, “Can we win?” 
Their report was issued on July 14 and the answer was a “conditional aff rmative.” 
The day the Goodpaster report was issued, the president sent McNamara with a study 
group to South Vietnam for a report on the situation there. According to Gibbons, 
McGeorge Bundy received a draft of that report, the day before McNamara left for 
Vietnam, which was apparently the norm for McNamara, who viewed such trips 
as “theater.” McNamara returned on July 20 and submitted the report to LBJ. The 
report recommended meeting Westmoreland’s troop request, but it appears Johnson 
had reached that decision before seeing the McNamara report. Further, it advocated 
calling up reserves and National Guard troops, something the president was loath to 
do. The report also advocated increasing Rolling Thunder from twenty-f ve hundred 
bombing attacks per month to four thousand or more.290 
In the fnal week before Johnson announced his escalation decision, Ball re-
membered, he was joined by Johnson civilian adviser Clark Clifford in opposition to 
Westmoreland’s troop request, writing, “Clifford emerged as a formidable comrade 
on my side of the barricades.” Mansfeld started the week with a Senate speech, call-
ing for reconvening the 1961 Geneva Conference, fearing a war that could last ten 
years, predicting: “We are in for an ordeal of indefnite duration and increasing sac-
rifce which will persist until the problem can be resolved at the conference table.”291 
On the same day Mansfeld delivered that speech, Johnson met with his top 
advisers in what Kahin considers the “most crucial” meeting of the week, and from 
the discussion before Johnson’s arrival, it is clear that it was expected that LBJ would 
agree to the Westmoreland/McNamara troop request. The president demanded Ball’s 
alternatives even after his aide said: “I have had my day in court.” Ball said, “We 
cannot win,” suggesting the United States make proposals to the South Vietnamese 
government that it could not accept; he predicted it would ask us to leave, take a 
neutralist position, and eventually fall under the control of North Vietnam. Johnson 
continued to fear the loss of American credibility; McGeorge Bundy, Rusk, and Lodge 
agreed with him. Horace Busby, a Johnson aide, told the president after this debate: 
“Given his point of view, Ball is impressively clear-headed and well organized,” but 
he saw Ball as captive to Korea and the French “f asco.”292 
The next day, July 22, Johnson met with the military leadership and his top 
aides. While the president gave the impression that he was still struggling with his 
decision, the way he described the three alternatives show that he was not. He called 
Ball’s proposal “the bugging out approach” and the status quo policy as a way to 
“lose slowly.” The third approach would add “100,000 men—recognizing that may 
not be enough—and adding more next year.” The military advisers agreed on the 
third approach, and fear for the loss of US prestige was their major reason. Yet none 
guaranteed success. Admiral David McDonald admitted, “We can’t win an all out 
war,” while McNamara expressed “the most extreme version of the domino theory” 
that Clifford had ever heard. 
After this meeting, Johnson met with his top advisers, and by the end of the 
session, the decision was made to go with the third option. John McCloy posed the 
question, “Would we be willing to take a Tito government or a VC victory?” Bundy’s 
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answer suggests a lack of foresight: “That’s where our plan begins to unravel.” Clif-
ford and Ball met afterward and were not optimistic. In talking of Johnson’s major 
advisers, Clifford said: “Individuals sometimes become so bound up in a certain 
course it is diffcult to know where objectivity stops and personal involvement be-
gins.” Later that day, Johnson predicted: “You’ll never hold Fulbright, Mansf eld, 
Church.”293 
Hoping that LBJ’s decision was not yet set in stone, Mansfeld sent another 
memo on July 23. The majority leader repeated earlier arguments but warned the 
president of the danger to what LBJ cared the most about, that divisiveness at home 
would threaten the Great Society programs. This time, being a team player who had 
had his day in court, Ball prepared the response to rebut Mansf eld’s arguments. 
Mansf eld was not alone. Supreme Court justice Arthur Goldberg, who was soon to 
be LBJ’s United Nations ambassador, prodded the president to take the matter to the 
UN. Harvard economist John Kenneth Galbraith, who had earlier cautioned Ken-
nedy about his Vietnam policy, wrote Johnson: “Much offcial crap to the contrary, 
. . . Vietnam is of no great intrinsic importance. Had it gone Communist after World 
War II, we would be just as strong as now and we would never waste a thought on 
it.” Galbraith wanted LBJ to have his aides “stop saying the future of mankind, the 
United States and human liberty is being decided in Vietnam,” because it was not.294 
Johnson met with McNamara, Clifford, and Goldberg at Camp David on July 
25. Clifford argued with prescience that the United States could lose f fty thousand 
men and billions of dollars that could “ruin us.” Goldberg sided with Clifford in 
opposition to McNamara’s proposal to call up the reserves. Clifford hoped to debate 
McNamara point by point, but Johnson ended the discussion; he was committed to 
escalation.295 
The next day, Johnson announced to his top advisers his decision to commit 
ground troops. Mansfeld continued to fght the decision, talking with LBJ the morn-
ing of the twenty-seventh and then meeting with Senators Fulbright, Richard Russell 
(D-GA), Aiken, John Sherman Cooper (R-KY), and John Sparkman (D-AL). Gibbons 
argued that these six Senate “Wise Men” “constituted an extraordinary ‘privy coun-
cil,’” and these senators offered Johnson a way to avoid a wider war. According to 
Kahin, the nineteen-point memo they submitted to the president was “considerably 
more moderate” than the position Mansfeld had expressed that morning.296 
The semiconsensus of the six expressed disappointment with McNamara’s han-
dling of the war, while the seventh point suggested a dilemma: “The main perplexity 
in the Vietnamese situation is that even if you win, totally, you still do not come 
out well. What have you achieved? It is by no means a ‘vital’ area of U.S. concern.” 
The six were in “full agreement that insofar as Viet Nam is concerned we are deeply 
enmeshed in a place where we ought not to be; that the situation is rapidly going 
out of control; and that every effort should be made to extricate ourselves.” Johnson 
had McNamara respond to eighteen of the points; the president himself replied to 
the nineteenth, calling McNamara “the best Secretary of Defense in the history of 
the country.”297 
On the same day the Senate Wise Men were meeting, Democratic senators who 
lacked infuence with the president spoke on the Senate foor. McGovern deplored 
the cost of the coming war and pushed for the enclave approach until the United 
States could get to the negotiating table. Church and Gruening delivered speeches 
that agreed with the South Dakotan, followed by Morse, who as usual, provided the 
most strident criticism of the president.298 
Just before 6:00 p.m. on July 27, LBJ touched base with the National Security 
Council prior to his scheduled meeting with the elected congressional leadership, 
making Mansfeld the only “Wise Man” in attendance. McGeorge Bundy wrote in his THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
notes of the NSC meeting that LBJ’s “unspoken object was to protect his legislative TO VIETNAM 
program.” 
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At the congressional meeting, Johnson dismissed three of the fve options open 
to him: all-out war, withdrawing from Vietnam, and staying with the status quo of 
eighty thousand troops. The president also dismissed the fourth option: call a state 
of emergency, ask Congress for money, request authority to call up the reserves, and 
send more combat battalions. LBJ rejected that option for fear of alarming the Sovi-
ets and Chinese. The option he selected was to commit only the number of troops 
requested by Westmoreland. No additional money would be asked for until January, 
and in the meantime, he would seek a diplomatic solution.299 
Johnson stubbornly claimed that this was not a change in policy. The senators 
and representatives present were so supportive that Gardner compared their com-
ments to “Fourth of July speeches,” and Bundy recorded in his notes, “The Leader-
ship seems might hawky so far.” Gardner mentions one exception. Near the end of 
the meeting, Mansfeld spoke, saying later, “I was not convinced by those who spoke 
before me. I wanted my views, in opposition, on the record.” Puffng on his pipe, 
Mansf eld pulled a three-page prepared statement from his pocket and read at least 
some of it, repeating his major arguments from numerous memoranda and con-
versations with Johnson. The majority leader pledged to support Johnson’s policy 
as best he could, but predicted “that escalation begets escalation” and was highly 
critical of the administration’s efforts to get to the bargaining table, saying: “We have 
offered too little, too late in the way of bringing about meaningful negotiations in 
this situation and we have not, to say the least, encouraged the French who could 
have and may still be able to play the decisive role in this connection.” Johnson did 
not respond; he merely nodded, but later wrote, “As always, [Mansf eld] expressed 
his opinion candidly.”300 
Johnson aide Jack Valenti, who was in attendance, wrote: 
Mansfeld’s discontent was remarkably prophetic. The majority leader never 
wavered in his assessment of Vietnam and its deadly impact on the nation. What 
might have happened if the president had listened to Mike Mansfeld and given 
his views more weight in his own mind? Mansfeld’s assay of Indochina was 
probably closer to the mark than other public men, with the possible exception 
of George Ball. . . . 
With Mansfeld’s comments to the president, the meeting had come to its 
end. The die was cast. The decision taken.301 
The next day, President Johnson announced his decision at a press conference 
at which Vietnam was one of several issues discussed, including the Great Society, 
before he felded questions. Most questions concerned Vietnam, but the format 
avoided the media scrutiny a presidential address would have invited. When asked, 
“[Does] sending additional forces to Viet-Nam imply any change in the existing 
policy of relying mainly on the South Vietnamese to carry out offensive opera-
tions and using American forces to guard American installations and to act as an 
emergency backup?” LBJ asserted disingenuously, “It does not imply any change in 
policy whatever.” The president continued to stick with McGeorge Bundy’s choice 
of “unconditional discussions” from the Johns Hopkins speech, not “negotiations,” 
proving Mansfeld’s charge that the United States “offered too little, too late” to f nd 
a way to the bargaining table. 
LBJ did not give the Joint Chiefs of Staff all that they wanted, which would have 
been option four explained at his July 27 meeting with congressional leaders. With 
a limited commitment, Johnson believed he could fnd a negotiated settlement and 
both pass and fund his Great Society program. As Moss put it, he chose to f ght the 
war on the “side,” not raising taxes, not explaining clearly to the America public what 
he hoped to accomplish, not calling up the reserves or National Guards, not seeking 
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an actual declaration of war from Congress. In his prepared remarks, Johnson said 
in part: 
We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else. 
. . . We intend to convince the Communists that we cannot be defeated by 
force of arms or by superior power. . . . 
I have today ordered to Viet-Nam . . . forces which will raise our f ghting 
strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces 
will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested. 
. . . but we will not surrender and we will not retreat. 
. . . I do not fnd it easy to send the fower of our youth, our f nest young 
men, into battle.302 
The year had started with 23,000 US troops “in country”; it would end with 
184,000. Johnson had listened to the advisers he had pleaded with to stay on after 
the death of Kennedy, over Ball, the lone administration dissenter. Johnson could 
have listened to old Senate hands like Mansfeld, Fulbright, and Russell, but did 
not. Clifford gave him a new voice of caution in the last week before escalation, but 
his advice was rejected, too. LBJ knew that he was endangering his Great Society 
legislation, but he feared attacks from Republican hawks as he remembered earlier 
charges about “who lost China,” and he was not willing to be the president who lost 
Indochina. Mann writes: “Quietly and without alarm, Johnson had launched the 
nation on nine costly years of warfare in Vietnam. . . . As Johnson would soon come 
to realize, to his profound and everlasting regret, he had taken his country into war 
without a clear mandate from either the people or the Congress.”303 
Conclusion 
We have traced an early antecedent rhetoric leading to the Vietnam War that has 
been characterized by a step-by-step rhetorical march to war in Southeast Asia. Cold 
War presidents and their successive administrations established by doctrine, design, 
and symbolic appeals an anti-Communism crusade that led inexorably to US par-
ticipation in a ground war in Vietnam. In this instance the history and rhetoric are 
not easily separated. 
During the Truman administration, “What seized the country’s emerging anti-
Communist elite was the fear that the real Soviet danger, one that rendered military 
aggression irrelevant, lay in the limitless promise of Soviet ideological expansion. 
Soviet rhetoric had long predicted Communism’s ultimate conquest of the world.” 
In addition, there was the fear that the Soviet Marxist doctrine would move them to 
pursue “the ultimate destruction of capitalist states.”304 
Eisenhower would follow Truman’s lead. As Shawn J. Perry-Giles indicates, 
Eisenhower identifed “communism as humanity’s primary enemy,” and his ad-
ministration pressed a “thorough and ambitious crusade against it.” Moreover, ad-
ministration offcials “worried that any Soviet actions, which might be viewed as a 
step toward peaceful resolution of the Cold War, would thwart America’s Cold War 
aims.”305 
In assessing President Kennedy, Steven R. Goldzwig and George N. Dioniso-
poulos note: “Perhaps his most perilous legacy lay in his determination to not only 
stay the course but up the ante in Vietnam.” The arc of Kennedy’s foreign policy 
public address “demonstrate[d] Kennedy’s determination to contest the Communist THE RHETORICAL ANTECEDENTS 
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Offering an incisive evaluation and indictment of Lyndon Johnson, John M. 
Murphy has noted, “Where Vietnam was concerned, Lyndon Johnson bound himself 
to his forebears. He cited the decisions of past presidents as the rationale for his 
policy in Vietnam. Such citations, in turn, led him to adopt a deductive structure 
for most of his speeches, an argument that demanded acceptance for his policy in 
Vietnam. The past was a sacred script; Lyndon Johnson would not be a textual devi-
ant. His slavish imitation of past conventions undermined his present authority. 
He appeared a prisoner to the past, a president who could not act alone or think 
through the problems that faced him.”307 
What is equally clear is that Johnson’s compass was not set by his administration 
alone. Every US president from 1945 to 1965 followed largely the same script; each 
called for an increased commitment to Vietnam rhetorically, politically, economi-
cally, and militarily. The escalation of the Vietnam War was the product of a nation 
mired in Cold War fears of Communism and assessments of developing nation-
states as particularly vulnerable to Chinese and Soviet infuence. The domino theory 
was reinforced rhetorically by successive US presidential administrations as Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson became obsessed with fending off geopolitical 
“losses” to the Reds. Dissenting voices both high and low were ignored. In the pro-
cess, a great nation soon found itself promoting its treasured ideals of democracy, 
freedom, and peace through the iron exercise of its unquestioned military might. 
The bellicosity of the effort began to overshadow the stated goal, sapping the Ameri-
can spirit and causing the “enemy” to dig in deeper for the long haul. The end of US 
military involvement would have to await the onset of another US administration as 
the cost in lives, treasure, and credibility tore at the American fabric and laid waste 
to a small country. Vietnam, a tiny nation that had largely been in the throes of a 
civil war, soon found itself in the eye of the hurricane of international Cold War 
machinations. The United States was poised for ten more years of war and additional 
decades of wrenching self-doubt.308 
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